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INTRODUCTION

This article is about the meaning and interpretation of the
United States Constitution. Questions of meaning and interpretation arise inevitably with a constitution such as ours, in which
the nature of the organization of the government and the relationship between the government and its citizens are set forth in
general, compressed, and sometimes vague language. These
questions become especially difficult to answer when a person
claims a right to act freely and a government claims the power to
prohibit or restrict that action.
Many scholars have considered it important, when considering such issues, to focus upon the original intent of the framers
of the Constitution, and these scholars inveigh against what they
view as an illegitimate and dangerous modern tendency to extend and expand the meaning of the Constitution beyond the
framers' original understanding. These "originalist" scholars
believe themselves to be rationalistic, tough-minded, responsible
and faithful to the basic principles and purposes underlying our
nation and its creation, they believe that they alone correctly understand that the function of the judiciary is to interpret and apply the law.
In this article, I consider whether the framers of the Constitution would have taken an "originalist" view in interpreting and
applying the Constitution. I will look at the philosophical influences that formed the basis for the climate of opinion in which
the framers lived and thought. There is widespread consensus
that the writings of the English philosopher John Locke embodied that climate more thoroughly than the writings of any other
author.' I will rely heavily on the contention that the framers
* Associate Professor, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; J.D.,
University of Michigan; Ph. D., University of Rochester.
I Many scholars and historians have noted and discussed the influence of Locke

on the views and understanding of the era. See, e.g., ALF MAPP, JR., THOMAS JEFFERSON, A STRANGE CASE OF MISTAKEN IDENTITY (1987). Other works that deal with the
thinking of the era and the philosophical influences upon the framers, and the in-
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were, in important respects, creating a constitutional structure
which reflected and applied Locke's philosophical views, and I
will investigate the implications of his writings on the relationship between the rights retained by citizens in a civil society, and
the rights of a majoritarian government to limit and restrict those
rights.2
I will then look at modern "originalism," especially the views
of Judge Robert Bork, one of the most influential, and certainly
the most conspicuous, of the originalist scholars. His views have
been thoroughly set forth, among other places, in his recent book
The Tempting of America.3 I will assess Bork's views in the light of
terpretation of natural rights theory include, among many others, AMERICA IN THEORY (Leslie Berlowitz, et. al eds. 1988); LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988) [hereinafter ORIGINAL INTENT]; GARRY WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1979); EDWARD DUMBOLD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW
(1978); LEONARD LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1963); SIDNEY HOOK, THE

PARADOXES OF FREEDOM (1962).
2 Much of the discussion in the secondary sources of Locke's influence pertains
to Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence and the obvious and
unmistakable Lockean doctrine and phraseology it contains. But the Declaration of
Independence justified the separation of the colonies from Britain, and the formation of a new republic, on the basis of ideas which were current and which were
generally accepted. No revolution could be justified effectively by plucking an obscure theory from the writings of a philosopher and then abandoning the theory as
soon as the dust settles. On the contrary, the reason that the ideas of the Declaration of Independence were able to sway the thoughts and emotions of the people
was precisely that these were ideas which were vividly, fervently and naturally accepted both by the American colonists., and the "civilized" world ("the opinions of
mankind") to whom the document was ultimately addressed.
These points are made effectively by the historian Carl Becker. He refers to
John Adams's complaint that the ideas of the Declaration were "hackneyed."
Becker responds that "[t]his is substantially true; but as a criticism .. .it is wholly
irrelevant, since the strength of the Declaration was precisely that it said what eve-

ryone was thinking. Nothing could have been more futile than an attempt to justify
a revolution on principles which no one had ever heard of before." CARL BECKER,
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 25 (1942). And elsewhere, Becker says that

"[m]ost Americans had absorbed Locke's works as a kind of political gospel; and
the Declaration, in its form, in its phraseology, follows closely certain sentences in
Locke's second treatise on government." Id. at 27.
3 BORK, ROBERT H., THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) [hereinafter TEMPTING].

I will also cite Bork's article, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47
IND. L. J. 3 (1971), reprinted in JACK N. RAKOVE, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION,
THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (1990) [hereinafter NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES].
For interesting reviews of Tempting, see Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork 's Grand In-

quisition, 99 Yale L. J. 1419 (1990); Gerard V. Bradley, Slaying the Dragon of Politics
with the Sword of Law, 1990 U. of I11.
L. Rev. 234 (1990); Stephen Carter, Bork Redux,
or How the Tempting of America Led People to Rise and BattleforJustice, 69 Tex. L. Rev.
759 (1990); Anthony E. Cook, The Tempting and Fall of Original Understanding, 1990
Duke L.J. 1163 (1990); Ronald Dworkin, Bork'sJurisprudence,57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657
(1990); Michael J. Gerhardt, Interpreting Bork, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1358 (1990);
George Kannar, Citizenship and Scholarship, 90 Colum L. Rev. 2017 (1990); Robert F.
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my discussion of the framers' views and intellectual attitudes. I
will focus on the question of what the framers would have considered to be the correct assumptions about the process of determining what substantive rights were embodied in their
Constitution, and what principles of interpretation should guide
the resolution of such conflicts. 4 I will then analyze the patterns
of constitutional argumentation of two recent cases, Bowers v.
Hardwick,5 and Cruzan v. Commissioner,6 and I will use these cases
as a springboard towards some tentative suggestions as to principles of constitutional argumentation which courts ought to
accept.
My central thesis is that the framers would not and could not
have been originalists in Bork's sense, and that the theory of conNagel, Meeting the Enemy, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057 (1990); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bork's
Dilemma, 76 Va. L. Rev. 337 (1990); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (1990).
Northwestern Law Review published no less than six reviews in a single volume.
See Mortimer Adler, Robert Bork: The Lessons to Be Learned, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121
(1990); George Anastaplo, Bork on Bork, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1142 (1990); Raoul Berger, Robert Bork's Contribution to Original Intention, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167 (1990);
Richard S. Kay, The Bork Nomination and the Defense of the Constitution, 84 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1190 (1990); Stephen Macedo, Originalism and the Inescapability of Politics, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 1203 (1990); Suzanna Sherry, Original Sin, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 1215
(1990).
4 Many scholars have speculated as to the specific substantive rights which the
framers intended to be embodied within their Constitution but the question as to
the framers' intentions with respect to their own intentions has received less attention. For two interesting articles addressing this problem, see Charles A. Lofgren,
The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent?, THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 117
(Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original
Intent, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 53
(Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990).
Professor Powell argues that there was a tension during the era of the framers
between a general suspicion towards any form of interpretation, on the one hand,
and the established methods of statutory interpretation, as found in the English
Common Law, on the other hand. Powell attributes the anti-interpretivist thinking
to an "unlikely alliance" between Enlightenment rationalism and British Protestantism. Powell, supra, at 54. Powell's ultimate conclusion is that "the claim or assumption that modern intentionalism was the original presupposition of American
constitutional discourse ... is historically mistaken." Id. at 88. Professor Lofgren
reexamines and comments upon the historical evidence adduced by Professor Powell and argues that we must distinguish between the intent of the framers and the
intent of the ratifiers. He concludes that "it is not too much to say that at least
some of the founders saw the ratifiers' historical or subjective intent as a check on
the constructions which cut loose from the original understandings of the sovereign people." Lofgren, supra, at 143. The articles by Professors Powell and Lofgren are discussed in Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 378-79 (1990).
5 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
6 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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stitutional interpretation advanced by present-day originalists
would have seemed absurd, if not unintelligible, to the framers.
One can be an originalist only by thinking very differently from
the framers. Only the assumptions and the "climate of opinion"
of our present era make originalism at all plausible to us; and the
climate of opinion in eighteenth century America, on political,
social, and moral issues was very different from our own.
Whatever the merits or demerits of the originalists' arguments as
to how we should interpret the Constitution, those arguments do
not reflect the framers' beliefs and intentions.
It was obvious to the framers that if their Constitution was to
provide the legal and philosophical basis for the growth and development of the nation, it had to be applied to specific cases. It
was equally obvious that as society evolved, issues and circumstances would arise which were not explicitly resolved by the text
of the Constitution, and that some principles of interpretation
would necessarily have to be chosen and implemented.
The "originalists" ' 7 are most concerned to argue against the
view that the Constitution may, and indeed must, be interpreted
to give effect to certain substantive values underlying its provisions, and that the great strength of the Constitution lies in "the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems
and current needs."' I shall call these anti-originalist thinkers
"organicists," 9 to stress their conviction that the Constitution
embodies principles sufficiently flexible to be adaptable to evolving social realities without doing violence to its meaning or
spirit.' °
7 Bork lists scholars whom he considers to be "originalists" as including Raoul
Berger, Michael McConnell, Lino Graglia and Joseph Grano. TEMPTING, supra note
3, at 223-24.

8 William J. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
CONSTITUTION, THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 27
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(1990) (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990) (speech delivered to the Text and Teaching Symposium at Georgetown University on October 12, 1985).
9 As an illustration of what I am calling "organicist" thinking, see Norman Dorsen, Rights in Theory, Rights in Practice, AMERICA IN THEORY (Leslie Berlowitz et. al

eds. 1988).
10 Under the heading "Theorists of Liberal Constitutional Revisionism," Bork

gives prominent position to Alexander M. Bickel, John Hart Ely, and Laurence
Tribe. Theorists he discusses more briefly under this heading include, among
others, Frank Michelman, Richard Parker, Paul Brest, Thomas Grey, David A. J.
Richards, Ronald Dworkin, Michael Perry, and Sanford Levinson. Bork tendentiously (and inaccurately) characterizes all of these thinkers as ones who "would
depart, in varying degrees, from the actual Constitution." TEMPrING, supra note 3,
at 207.
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Originalists accuse organicists of supporting "judicial activism" and 'judicial legislation," and they accuse them of endorsing the power of judges to create, rather than interpret the law.
Originalists deride organicists for purportedly encouraging
judges to substitute their opinions on social policy and morality
for the opinions of the democratically elected representatives,
contending that the judges, by so doing, exceed their constitutionally mandated powers. Originalists, therefore, believe that
their views alone are faithful to the democratic ideals on which
this nation was founded, and that organicists are unfaithful to
these principles and purposes.
This controversy between originalists and organicists suggests the following two questions: First, in the intellectual and
philosophical climate of their day, would the framers have
imagined that the substantive rights of an American citizen were
to be determined by focusing on the framers' purported "intentions," freeze-framed and fossilized at some moment in time; or,
second, would they have assumed that the process of determining these rights would necessarily be a flexible, dynamic process,
which would always require the thoughtful attention of people of
good will, responding to human experience and social conditions
as they evolve?
In addressing these questions, this article will consider the
respects in which the framers thought differently from us. The
answer, in short, is that the framers seriously accepted the view
that human beings possess natural rights which exist as a component of the natural law. The natural law consists of a set of binding prescriptions and proscriptions which exist independently of
the will or action of any human being, but which are discoverable
by human beings. This idea is extraordinarily difficult for the
modem mind to comprehend and take seriously, even though
modern writers often formulate the point. Some modern writers,
especially some originalists, treat the framers' acceptance of the
existence of natural law and natural rights as if it were an amusing, slightly embarrassing quirk, as if the framers had earnestly
professed a belief in the existence of leprechauns. These writers
treat the framers' belief in natural law and natural rights as something to be acknowledged, tolerated with a smile, and then
largely ignored for more "serious" topics which the modem author feels more comfortable discussing. This attitude misunderstands the framers to the greatest possible degree."
II For an interesting discussion of the framers' fundamental commitment to the
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Implicit in the originalists' attitude towards the eighteenth
century's acceptance of natural law and natural right is the notion
that this belief is a mere abstract theory which can be analytically
separated and detached from a discussion of the concrete princi-2
ples which the framers intended to embody in the Constitution.'
Nothing could be further from the truth. A belief in the ideas of
natural law and natural rights is inextricably bound up with a fundamentally different view of the ultimate nature of the universe-a fundamentally different set of metaphysical views and
presuppositions. And merely understanding these views is not
enough; what is necessary is the almost impossible task, to the
modem reader, of assimilating, or "sensing from within," what it
felt like to think about such concepts as "natural law," and "natural right," under the sway of an utterly different intellectual environment. A review of this way of thinking will help us to
understand the framers' intentions, and will also make clear the
meaning of certain specific constitutional concepts and provisions, such as the notion of "due process," and the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
The metaphysical views and presuppositions to which I refer
find their purest expression in the works of Aristotle and the medieval Thomist philosophers. As will be shown, these views survive in an explicit and undiluted form in Locke, and were passed
on through him to the intellectual climate of opinion that lay at
the heart of the ideas the framers embodied in the Constitution.
Though these views are no longer in the ascendancy, they retain
some modem adherents. The modem tendency, which passes
for intellectual sophistication, is to scoff at the notion that there
are such things as metaphysical views and presuppositions, and
to regard inquiries into such views as sterile and futile. But there
are two consequences of this modem arrogance: first, we tend to
accept our own metaphysical presuppositions unknowingly and
uncritically, and, second, we blissfully misconstrue and misrepresent the meaning and the understanding which earlier thinkers
attached to their own statements. Both these hazards are evident
in the writings of the originalists. It is a reasonable working assumption that if an examination of the writings of Locke provides
us with an understanding of constitutional language that has
doctrine of natural rights, see Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Unconstitutional?, 100
YALE L.J. 1073, 1075, 1078 (1990).
12 This strategy was illustrated by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas' responses to questions about natural law posed at his confirmation hearings.
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proved controversial or difficult to interpret, then we should take
very seriously the implications of these writings with respect to
the interpretation of that language.'"
I.
A.

THE METAPHYSICS OF NATURAL RIGHTS AND NATURAL LAW

Presuppositions

The metaphysical views and presuppositions underlying natural rights and natural law theory may be summarized as first, a
teleological conception of the universe; second, a tendency to
run together a descriptive and an evaluative sense of the term
"nature;" and third, a tendency to run together a descriptive and
a prescriptive sense of the term "law." The teleological conception of the universe is the idea that the universe and all particular
things in it are organized in terms of some overall purpose.
Many thinkers holding this view argue that the idea of an end or
purpose implies some higher rational being which imposes, or
conceives of, the purpose, and thus they infer the existence of a
Deity. Other thinkers reject, or at least do not stress, this inference, and are willing to speak of a "natural" or "rational" order
of things in a sense not necessarily implying the existence of a
supernatural being who imposes the order or design. 4
The second presupposition is the tendency to identify with
each other the descriptive and evaluative senses of the terms "nature" and "natural." Writing from a twentieth century perspective, one is tempted to call this a tendency to "confuse" the two
senses, and to refer to arguments which are based upon this
"confusion" as "fallacies."'15 But, for profoundly deep-seated
13 Even Bork appears to acknowledge this, or something quite close to it. In the
context of discussing the tendency of some moderns to engage in what he regards
as wild theorizing about the meaning of the Constitution, he writes: "It turns out,
though previously it had never been suspected, that in order to understand the
American Constitution ratified in 1787, one must study not John Locke or even
James Madison, but a modem German Marxist." TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 134.
The syntax of this sentence suggests that Bork acknowledges that the study of
Locke is necessary, or at least relevant to an understanding of the meaning of the
Constitution. So this article appears to be an enterprise invited by Bork himself.
14 See, e.g., SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURAE NATURAE ET GENTIUM (seventeenth
century German philosopher), partially reprinted in GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 161 (1973).

15 This tendency survives to the present day. As an illustration of this sort of
confusion, consider the argument that because homosexual activity is in some descriptive sense "unnatural," in that it is sexual activity not directed towards procreation, it follows that homosexual activity is an "unnatural act," in the sense of a
morally objectionable act. This modem version of the equivocation between a descriptive and a normative sense of the term "natural," now that we do distinguish

716

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:709

reasons, most thinkers before the nineteenth century did not see
the terms "natural" and "natural law" as expressing two separate, distinguishable concepts, one descriptive, the other normative. Neither the Aristotelian nor the Platonist tradition
distinguished sharply between an ultimate metaphysical truth
and an ultimate value. Rather, both traditions saw one integrated, indivisible concept: Ultimate facts about the universe and
the ultimate values it contains are one and the same thing.
The third metaphysical assumption to which I refer-again,
the modem reader is tempted to refer to this assumption as a
"fallacy"-is a tendency to coriflate the descriptive and prescriptive senses of the term "law." Scientific "laws," for example the
"law" of gravity, describe how objects behave under certain conditions. If an object is thrown off a cliff, it "follows" the law of
gravity without choice, and falls.' 6 On the other hand, statutory
"laws" prescribe behavior. For example, it is the law that you
must, in general, come to a full stop when you are driving and
encounter a stop sign. Here the question whether to follow the
law is a matter of choice and volition. To our minds and our
common sense, the difference between these two senses is obvious and unmistakable. Yet throughout much of human history,
continuing through the eighteenth century, these senses were
not sharply differentiated. A thing simply was required to "follow" the laws essential to its-nature whether it was an inanimate
object or a human being.
B.

Classical Naturalism

With these metaphysical presuppositions having been made
explicit, we may set forth a summary of a traditional, Aristotelian,
argument for the existence of natural law and natural right. This
argument was restated by Locke, and passed into the general understanding of the framers. It is an understatement to say that
many volumes, if not libraries, could be written (and have been
the two senses, is merely a logical blunder. Even if there is some narrow descriptive
sense in which homosexual activity is "unnatural," no conclusion whatsoever follows about the moral rightness or wrongness of homosexual activity. The conclusion is invalidly reached through the fallacy of equivocation-that is, the fallacy of
using the term "natural" in one sense (descriptively) in the premise, and in another
sense (normatively) in the conclusion.
16 This is notwithstanding the experience of a character in a Looney Tunes cartoon who walked safely off a cliff without following the law of gravity, with the explanation that he had never studied law.
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written) explicating, objecting to, and tracing the implications of
this argument, but it goes, in substance, as follows:
(1) In general, the fundamental nature of a thing is
equated with the end or purpose of the thing; the question
"What is it?" is identical to the question "What is it for?" In
Aristotelian terms, the final cause of a thing (its natural end or
purpose) is identical
to its formal cause (its "whatness" or
"actuality").' 7
(2) Some ends and purposes of a thing are natural, in
the sense that when the thing is left to generate and develop in
its own, unhindered way, it will follow one path rather than
another.' 8 Therefore, the highest fulfillment, or the highest
"virtue," of which a thing is capable is the complete fulfillment
of its natural end or purpose.
(3) Therefore, to understand the nature of human beings, it is necessary to know their highest end and purpose.
When one observes human beings, one sees that they are animals who are differentiated from other animals in that their
essential, natural function is to be rational. They belong to
the genus "animal," and the species "rational."
(4) Rationality is conceived of not as a static set of capacities and experiences, but as an active way of life. To be rational (which is also to be virtuous) is not merely to have
certain characteristics, or to be in some state, but rather to act
and behave in a certain way.
(5) Given this account of the nature of human beings,
the identification of rationality with behavior, and identification of the nature of a thing with its purpose, it follows that the
essential nature of a human being is to live according to a set
of rational principles.
(6) When one views the world, one observes regularities
in its functioning. We observe that everything in the world
behaves in certain ways and according to certain laws which
determine how each thing is "obliged" to behave as a consequence of its essential nature.
(7) Just as there are natural laws that describe how
things are "obliged" to behave, so, by parallel reasoning,
17 This is not counterintuitive. If you are in a friend's house whose taste runs to
modern, abstract objects, you may be unsure whether a particular object is a work
of art, or a piece of furniture, and if the latter, what type of furniture it is. To find

out what the object is, you must know whether it is for looking at, sitting on, or

placing a drink on.
18 Aristotle, too, had difficulty putting this in a non question-begging way. The
classic example is the acorn, which "naturally" becomes an oak tree, and only "accidentally," or "adventitiously" becomes squirrel food.
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there are natural laws which determine how a human being is
obliged to behave in the manifestation of its essential nature,
namely to live according to certain rational principles; and
these principles constitute the natural law.
Some modem readers may regard this derivation as a kind of
sophistical hocus-pocus. It is not my intent to either affirm or deny
the soundness of the argument. It is clear that the argument makes
heavy use of the three presuppositions I discussed above. To the
modem reader, it also contains an equivocation on the term
"obliged" between the statements numbered (6) and (7). But to the
framers, this was a familiar and natural way of thinking.
Three implications of this manner of thinking are crucial. First,
natural law exists independently of anyone's will or fiat or preference. Second, there is no incongruity in the notion of a law's imposing an obligation without a human sanction imposed for a breach.
The notion of an obligation is built into the concept of a law, as
shown by the above derivation. It is metaphysically incoherent to
speak of a law of nature not imposing an obligation; the obligation
imposed by the law simply is an indivisible part of the essential nature of the human beings to whom the law applies. Third, the natural law has substantive content. That is, the specific content of the
obligations imposed by the natural law are fixed by the rational nature of human beings; the content is not subject to the opinion or
predilection of any person.
II.

A.

JOHN LOCKE

Introduction

These views of natural law survived clearly in the writings of
John Locke. I will look at two separate aspects of Locke's philosophy: his "consent" theory of the basis for political authority,
and his "light of nature" theory of natural rights. Locke's political theory is well known and is widely discussed; his doctrine of
natural rights is often mentioned superficially, but it is less frequently explained clearly in the context of the history of metaphysical and moral philosophy which form the necessary
background to an understanding of the doctrine. Further, it is
this doctrine of natural rights, understood through the illumination of its historical antecedents, which most clearly leads to a
proper interpretation of certain constitutional provisions and
which suggests that the framers could not have imagined that
contemporary originalism was a satisfactory principle of constitutional interpretation.

1992]

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

719

Locke's political theory of governmental authority based
upon consent is set forth most clearly and thoroughly in his Second Treatise of Government (Treatise). This is the work of
Locke most familiar to modern readers. It does not contain a
full-scale derivation of the theory of natural rights; rather Locke
postulates the existence of natural rights as a starting point. For
the explicit derivation and discussion of the theory of natural
rights, one must look to his Essays on the Law of Nature (Essays).
B.

Locke's Theory of Natural Law and Natural Rights
Locke's starting point in the Treatise is a theory of intrinsic
value based upon the fundamental concepts of a "natural right,"
and the "law of nature." It is a basic moral and metaphysical
truth, for Locke, that all human beings possess natural rights.
These rights are given not by any human law giver, but rather
they form a part of the rational order of the universe. Locke,
following a long philosophical tradition, terms this rational order
the "law of nature." To expand these conclusions into a fullfledged theory, Locke must explain first what specific rights are
included within the inventory of those naturally possessed by
human beings; second, he must give some account of the nature
of these rights-what they are and what their status is among the
inventory of things which exist in the universe; and, third, Locke
must explain the way in which we come to know of the existence
of natural rights-the basis for our knowledge and certainty that
such rights exist.
1. The Specific Inventory of Natural Rights
Locke addresses the first of these issues, the specific inventory of natural rights, in the Treatise, and the second and third,
more philosophical issues, in the Essays. Locke most frequently
summarizes the specific natural rights as comprising "life, liberty
and property." There is a danger, however, that this formulation
will mislead the modern reader.' 9 Locke repeatedly stresses the
importance of "property" as a natural right, and it is clear that
this is the right which he regards as most basic. An oft-encountered criticism of Locke's treatment of the natural right of prop19 A proper understanding of Locke's theory of property will provide insights as
to the framers' actual intentions about how the Constitution was intended to regulate economic institutions. As we shall see, this understanding may cast doubt
upon the conclusions of some originalists as to the framers' intentions with respect
to the purported constitutional guaranteeing of economic rights. See infra notes 1930 and accompanying text.
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erty is that he was presenting a crass, politically-motivated
justification, in the guise of natural philosophy, for the class interests of the landed gentry. But this criticism is wide of the mark
because it misunderstands Locke's use of the term "property."
In one usage of the term, Locke did understand "property" to
mean "the ownership of wealth," but in its most basic sense, he
used the term property to mean essentially "the general set of
material conditions necessary for human well-being."' 20 Thus, in
the earliest formulation of the content of the law of nature in the
Treatise, Locke asserts that the "state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one; and reason, which is
that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it that, being
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his
life, health, liberty, or possessions.
"2
And shortly thereafter,
Locke states that a human being must "preserve the rest of mankind," and must not "take away or impair the life, or what tends
to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods
of another. ' 22 Later in the Treatise, when Locke uses the phrase
"life, liberty and property," it is a reasonable conclusion that he
uses that phrase as a convenient, shortened form of the broader
formulations he first introduced.
At least twice in the Treatise, Locke defines the term "property" as a person's "life, liberty and estates." ' 23 These quotations, too, show that Locke uses the term "property" to refer not
to the crass ownership of physical objects, but to the general conditions necessary for the attainment of human well being and satisfaction. Scholars have speculated as to why Thomas Jefferson
substituted the expression "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence for the Lockean phrase
"life, liberty and property." The answer is that Jefferson understood the implications of Locke's phrase "life, liberty and property," and substituted another phrase which would more
20 As Professor Levy put it, Locke used the word "property" not "to denote
merely a right to things; he meant a right to rights." ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 1,
at 276 n.l. Again, Levy states: "Locke used the word 'property' to mean all that
belongs to a person, especially the rights he wished to preserve." Id.
21 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 6 (Bobbs-Merrill ed.,
The Library of Liberal Arts 1952 (1690))(emphasis added)[hereinafter SECOND
TREATISE].
22 Id.

23 See id. §§ 87, 123 (where Locke speaks of men uniting "for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name
Property").
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accurately express the intended meaning, and would be less
likely to mislead readers.
Nothing could be more mistaken than to suppose that
Locke's doctrine of the natural right of property provides a theoretical basis for the acquisition of great wealth, and for a general
protection of commercial and economic activity directed towards
such acquisition. On the contrary, the natural right to property is
strictly limited, in Locke's writings, to the direct products of
one's own personal labor, and one's right to acquire is limited to
one's personal needs. This is clear first from Locke's articulation, two centuries before Karl Marx, of a labor theory of value,
and second, from his theory of "spoilage," or "waste."
It may surprise some people that Locke articulated what the
modern reader is likely to identify as a "marxist" labor theory of
value, even to the extent of using the marxist metaphor of "mixing" one's labor with a thing:
[Elvery man has a property in his own person; this nobody has
any right to but himself. The labor of his body and the work of
his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in,
he has mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is
his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him
removed from the common state nature has placed it in, it has
by this labor something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to
what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough and
as good left in common for others.2 4
Locke anticipates the objection that this theory endorses a natural right to acquire "as much [property] as he will," 25 and squarely
rejects it. As to how much property we are naturally entitled to,
Locke writes: "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in; whatever is beyond this is more than his share and belongs
to others."'26 From this general theory of property, Locke goes on
to articulate a natural right to property in land as a special case, not
as the paradigm of the general theory. Locke explains: "Property in
[land], too, is acquired as [in other goods.] As much land as a man
tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so
much is his property. He by his labor does, as it were, enclose it
24
25
26

Id. § 27.

Id. § 31.
Id.
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from the common." ' 27 Locke acknowledges that in his "modern" society, things are not quite as simple as his agrarian, labor-intensive
model of the creation of value would indicate. He reiterates that in
the model society, in which there was an effectively infinite oversupply of natural goods and land for the number of people who 'demanded them:
The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of
men's labor and the conveniences of life. No man's labor
could subdue or appropriate all, nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part, so that it was impossible for any
man, this way, to entrench upon. the right of another.... This
measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself
without injury to anybody.... 2
Locke then discusses the creation of money, which he defines as
"some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that
by mutual consent men would take in exchange for the truly useful
but perishable supports of life,"' 29 and he acknowledges that the use
of money has made possible, by tacit agreement, "disproportionate
and unequal possession of the earth." 3 But the natural right to
property is limited by the labor theory and the concept of spoilage.
By positive law, people may agree to an unequal distribution, but
the right of each person to his share as defined by the labor theory
remains a natural right. Conversely, there is no natural right to anything more than that which is defined by the labor-spoilage theory.
This analysis also makes clear why Locke sometimes seems to refer
to land as the paradigm of ownership of property. His theory of the
natural right of property was derived using for a model a simple
society in which land and its cultivation was a necessary basis for the
creation of all the other forms of wealth required for human
subsistence.
An analysis of Locke's views about property ought to'be of interest to those who believe, quite wrongly, that the framers intended
a general, unrestricted natural right to acquire property. Anyone
who wishes to find such a protection in the Constitution must locate
a theoretical basis for it in something other than the climate of opinion of the time as articulated by Locke.
27

28
29
30

Id. § 32.

Id. § 36.
Id. § 47.
Id.
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The Nature and Status of Natural Rights and Natural
Law

With respect to the second question, as to the nature of
human rights-their "ontological status," as a philosopher might
say-Locke gives an account which is remarkably close to the paradigm Aristotelian argument set forth above. Natural rights are
part of the objective nature of things. The "laws of nature"
which define and determine natural human rights are as much a
part of the universe as the scientific laws which determine the
behavior of material objects. The existence and nature of natural
rights may be apprehended and understood by human beings,
but their existence and nature in no way depends upon the opinion or perception of any human being. Thus, Locke states in the
Essays that the existence of the law of nature may be derived
from "the very constitution of this world, wherein all things observe a fixed law of their operations and a manner of existence
appropriate to their nature. "''
He observes that "it seems just
therefore to inquire whether man alone has come into the world
altogether exempt from any law applicable to himself....
Locke answers that "it does not seem that man alone is independent of laws while everything else is bound. On the contrary, a manner of acting is prescribed to him that is suitable to
his nature.... "533
Locke quotes Aristotle's statement that "the special function
of man is the active exercise of the mind's faculties in accordance
with rational principle," 4 and Locke determines that Aristotle
"rightly concludes that the proper function of man is acting in
conformity with reason, so much so that man must of necessity
perform what reason prescribes. 3 5 Locke sums up by stating
that the law of nature is "the decree of the divine will discernible
by the light of nature and indicating what is and what is not in
conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason com3 6
manding or prohibiting.
Notwithstanding his references to the "divine will," Locke
does not argue that we know the natural law through divine reve31 JOHN LOCKE, ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF NATURE,
JURISPRUDENCE:

TEXT AND
(1973)[hereinafter ESSAYS].
32 Id. at 217-18.
33 Id. at 220.
34 Id. at 219.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 218.
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lation, or through any direct activity of a divine being. Rather, he
believes: "[W]e do not investigate here what a man can experience who is divinely inspired, or what a man can behold who is
illuminated by a light from heaven, but what a man who is endowed with understanding, reason, and sense-perception, can by
the help of nature and his own sagacity search out and examine."3 7 It is essential to our thinking about the Constitution to
understand that these views, which we tend to associate with an
earlier period, were held and articulated so explicitly by the
thinker who is widely regarded as the single greatest philosophical influence on the framers of the Constitution.38
3.

The Basis for Our Knowledge of Natural Rights and
Natural Law

How do we come to know the truths about natural rights and
the natural law? What is the basis for our certainty that some
statements about natural rights and natural law are true? These
"how do we know" questions-epistemological questions, the
philosopher would call them-are especially acute for Locke.
Earlier thinkers could resort to solutions such as a "special
faculty," or a "moral intuition," distinct from sense experience,
which infallibly delivered conclusions as to moral and metaphysical truths. These thinkers could argue that such truths were apprehended directly by reason, or that they were known innately,
or inscribed directly upon the human mind with no dependence
upon sense experience.
But these solutions were not available to Locke because he
was an empiricist. That is, he believed that all knowledge must
Id. at 222.
Becker asserts that while not every eighteenth century American would have
accepted this philosophy, Jefferson "phrased it, without qualification, as the 'common sense of the subject'," and that "the underlying preconceptions from which
[this natural rights philosophy] is derived, were commonly taken for granted."
BECKER, supra note 2, at 26. Becker continues:
That there is a 'natural order' of things in the world, cleverly and expertly designed by God for the guidance of mankind; that the 'laws' of
this natural order may be discovered by human reason; that these laws
so discovered furnish a reliable and immutable standard for testing
the ideas, the conduct, and the institutions of men-these were the
accepted premises, the preconceptions, of most eighteenth century
thinking, not only in America but also in England and France. They
were, as Jefferson says, the 'sentiments of the day, whether expressed
in conversation, in letters, printed essays, or the elementary books of
public right.' "
37
38
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ultimately have its source in sense experience, or at least that
sense experience must play some part in all claims to factual
knowledge. It is difficult to be committed to empiricism, and simultaneously to maintain a theory of natural law and natural
rights, because the one thing that seems obvious is that the content of natural law, however we may claim to know it, is not perceived straightforwardly through the external senses. We cannot
just look at a situation and perceive natural rights and laws, as we
can perceive size, shape, color, and so forth.3 9 But it would have
been inconsistent with his empiricism for Locke to claim that
these truths were directly apprehended by reason, or by a moral
faculty, or by intuition, without sense experience forming any
part of the ground for our certainty.
Locke's solution to this dilemma is an uneasy compromise,
which we may summarize by saying that he believed that truths
about natural law and natural rights were known through reason
acting upon sense experience. Such truths are not known innately. They are not "dictates of reason," in the sense of being
known independently of sense experience.4 0
Nor can the law of nature be known through "tradition," as
Locke takes great pains to argue. A mere habitual way of thinking and believing, shared by members of a society and passed on
to successive generations, cannot amount to reliable knowledge
of the law of nature. There are so many conflicting traditions
and ways of thinking among human beings that tradition could
not possibly serve as a reliable indicator of the truths about natural law. In Locke's words, there is "so much variety among conflicting traditions it would be impossible to determine what the
law of nature is, and it would be difficult to decide completely
what is true and what is false, what is law and what is opinion,
what is commanded by nature and what by utility, what advice
reason gives and what instructions are given by society."'"
Human traditions are relative to time, place, and historical and
cultural accident, while this cannot be true, in Locke's view, with
respect to the existence and characteristics of natural law.
Locke also offers another argument of a form which later
39 Locke would be quick to point out that under certain objective conditions or
when an observer is in certain subjective circumstances, the observer may also be
mistaken or deluded about size, shape, color, and so forth.
40 The law of nature is not "the dictate of reason, since reason does not so much
establish and pronounce this of nature as search for it and discover it ...... ESSAYS,
supra note 31, at 218.
4' Id. at 223-24.
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philosophers have termed "infinite regress. '42 A tradition is, by
definition, learned from someone else. If one searches back to
the "author of the tradition," one must either go back infinitely
far, or one must come to someone who originated the tradition.
If we must go back infinitely far, then we will never arrive at the
source of our knowledge of the tradition. On the other hand, if
we do come to the author of the tradition, then the ultimate
source of reliability for the tradition is not tradition itself, but
rather the act of knowing by the author of the tradition. This
argument shows that tradition cannot, in either instance, be the
ultimate basis for our knowledge of the truths of natural law and
natural right.
Locke's view is that a human being may know the law of nature not innately, but directly, through the exercise of his own
faculties, without the intervention of any other person. As Locke
sometimes puts it, the law of nature may be known by the "light
of nature. '4 3 This medieval expression is distracting and misleading to the modern reader, but Locke reassures us that all he
means by it is that "there is some sort of truth to the knowledge
of which a man can attain by himself and without the help of another, if he makes proper use of the faculties he is endowed with
by nature. ' 44 And the faculties to which Locke refers turn out to
be no more mysterious than reason and sense experience. 45 To

understand the dictates of nature, a person must engage in careful, painstaking, attentive and sympathetic use of his rational faculties, activated by and acting upon sense experience.
It is important to reiterate how sharply and categorically
Locke rejected the "traditionalist" theory. Tradition cannot
yield knowledge because of the differences and inconsistencies
among various traditions, and the absence of independent criteria to decide which tradition correctly incorporates the law of nature. But an obvious objection to Locke's own theory as to how
we discover the existence and content of the law of nature is that
it does not provide any ultimate criterion of reliability either. If
42 The paradigm of the argument is illustrated by the story of the two philosophers who are discussing how the earth is supported. One argues that it is held by
a giant, who is himself supported by standing on the back of a huge elephant. "But
how is the elephant supported?" asks the other. "It stands on the back of an even
larger turtle." "But how is the turtle supported?" "It stands on an even larger
turtle, and you can stop asking, because from here it's turtles all the way down."
43 EssAys, supra note 31, at 221.
44 Id. at 222.
45 This is not to deny that there are many puzzling and mysterious questions to
be asked about these faculties.
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two people use their rational and sensory faculties as Locke directs, and yet arrive at conflicting conclusions as to the nature
and content of natural law and natural rights, it appears that
Locke does not give us an independently reliable test to determine which of them is right.
Locke acknowledges that this objection "readily presents itself" and he formulates the objection himself: "[I]f the law of
nature becomes known by the light of nature, how does it happen
that where all are enlightened there are so many blind, since this
inward law is implanted by nature in all men? How does it arise
that very many mortals are without knowledge of this law and
nearly all think of it differently, a fact that does not seem possible
46
if all men are led to knowledge of it by the light of nature?
Locke answers that this objection would have force against the
"innate inscription" theory, but it has none against his own theory, inasmuch as "granted that our mental faculties can lead us to
the knowledge of this law, nevertheless it does not follow from
this that all men necessarily make proper use of these faculties." 4 7 Locke describes the proper use of these faculties as follows: "Careful reflection, thought, and attention by the mind is
needed, in order that by argument and reasoning one may find a
way from perceptible and obvious things into their hidden nature ....

"48

The law of nature comprises truths which are "hid-

den like the treasures of the earth, and in order to find them,"
people "have to equip themselves; and it is with great labour that
those resources which lie hidden in darkness are to be brought to
the light of day. They do not present themselves to idle and listless people, nor indeed to all those who search for them, since we
notice some also who are toiling in vain." '49 And why do so many
toil in vain? Locke answers:
[M]ost people are little concerned about their duty; they are
guided not so much by reason as either by the example of
others, or by traditional customs and the fashion of the country, or finally by the authority of those whom they consider
good and wise.... It does not therefore follow that the law of

nature cannot be known by the light of nature because there
are only few who, neither corrupted by vice nor carelessly indifferent, make a proper use of that light.5 °
46
47

48
49
50

Id. at 225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., at 226.
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But the same questions remain. What if two people follow all
Locke's rules and still arrive at conflicting results? That is, they
both engage in careful reflection and thought, equip themselves, are
not idle or listless, and so forth, and yet still disagree. How do we
know which one is right? Presumably one of them is "corrupted by
vice" or "carelessly indifferent," but how do we know which is
which? One modem reaction, shared by Bork and the originalists,
and by others who are not originalists, is that no response is possible. Questions as to ultimate laws, rights, and values, simply have
no answer, at least in any sense implying any demonstrable objective
validity. To this way of thinking, conclusions with respect to such
matters amount to nothing more than expressions of individual
preference, predilection or prejudice. I will defer further consideration of this disagreement between Locke and the modem "originalists" until we have looked at the political philosophy that Locke
developed based upon the starting point of the theory of natural
rights.
Locke's Political Theory

C.

Because the rights and freedom of human beings are ultimate values, and because the creation of a system of laws necessarily involves curtailment of these rights and restrictions on
human freedom, Locke must explain the basis for legitimate
political and legal authority. He finds the only possible basis for
such authority in the consent of people, and the delegation of
their natural rights, in what amounts to a trusteeship arrangement, to the government. Specifically, Locke states: "Men being
...by nature free, equal, and independent, no one can be put
out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another,
without his own consent."'" Thus, according to Locke, "that
which begins and actually constitutes any political society, is
nothing but the consent of any number of freemen capable of a
majority, to unite and incorporate in to such a society. And this
is that, and that only, which did or could give beginning to any
lawful government in the world."'5 2 Because generally no one
gives explicit consent to the authority of government, Locke relies heavily on the doctrine that a person tacitly consents to such
authority by "accepting the benefits of ownership of possessions," and by enjoying "any part of the dominions of [a]
51 SECOND TREATISE,
52

Id. § 99.

supra note 21, at § 95.
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Human beings possess natural rights whether they live in a
civil society or in the "state of nature, ' 54 and, furthermore, they
possess all the rational and sensory faculties necessary to discern
the binding quality of the natural law in either situation. Because
human beings are naturally rational (though they possess other,
less noble traits as well), the "state of nature" for Locke is not the
lawless "war of all against all" which it was for Hobbes. 5 But the
state of nature nevertheless has drawbacks and disadvantages
that impel people to consent to delegate their natural rights and
power to a government to form a civil society. Specifically, Locke
discusses three such drawbacks. First, there lacks "an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong.... 56 Even though
the law of nature is binding and "intelligible to all rational creatures,"5 7 because people are sometimes "biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of studying [the natural law]," 58
they sometimes are not willing to allow that this law "bind[s]
them in the application of it to their particular cases."' 59 Second,
"[i]n the state of nature, there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to
the established law. . .. ";60 and, third, "there often [lacks] the

power to back and support the sentence when right, and give it
due execution." 6 1
The central issue in interpreting Locke's political theory is
53 Id. § 119. Locke's doctrine of tacit consent has been heavily criticized, but it is
unnecessary to the purposes of this Article to discuss these criticisms.
54 The "state of nature" was a concept used by various theorists (e.g., Hobbes
and Rousseau), as well as Locke, to describe a (presumably hypothetical, or logically constructed) situation in which human beings live prior to the formation of a
civil society. The point of the hypothesis is to make generalizations and observation about human nature, and the nature of the universe. These observations constrain and dictate the kind of civil society, and the kinds ofjustifications for political
authority which the theorist goes on to defend.
55 Thomas Hobbes, writing a half a century before Locke, portrayed a grim state
of nature in which human beings are motivated by fear of and irrational competitiveness with each other. The civil society which comes out of Hobbes' state of
nature is one in which the people agree to cede all of their natural rights and powers to an all powerful sovereign which is not a party to the agreement at all, and
which thereafter is the sole source of rights.

56 SECOND TREATISE,
57 Id.
58

Id.

59 Id.
60

Id. § 125.

61 Id. § 126.

supra note 21, at § 124.
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the question of the extent to which people, in the pursuit of creating a civil society, renounce and delegate their natural rights
and powers to the government. Is the delegation categorical and
general, or are there limits and boundaries to the delegation, and
if so, what is the nature and source of these limits? On the one
hand, Locke writes that "every man, by consenting with others to
make one body politic under one government, puts himself
under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the
determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else
this original compact ...would signify nothing. ' '6 2 And when a
person enters civil society, the "power.

.

. 'of doing whatsoever

he thought fit for the preservation of himself' and the rest of
63
mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by society."
But because the value which is being protected by the creation of a civil society is the freedom of human beings to exercise
their natural rights, a person consents to the delegation of these
rights to a government only because civil society allows him to
enjoy more fully and comfortably the freedoms to which he is
naturally entitled. Locke explains clearly that the consent is
granted only for certain specific purposes which limit and circumscribe the permissible bounds of legal and governmental authority. A person delegates his natural rights "to preserve himself,
his liberty and property-for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse";'
and legitimate public power therefore "can never be supposed to
extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure
everyone's property ...."65 And Locke reiterates that the force
end but the
of law may legitimately be "directed to no other
66
peace, safety, and public good of the people.
Even in the above-quoted passages where Locke sets forth
the requirement that natural powers and rights be delegated to
form a civil society, Locke immediately adds limiting and qualifying clauses which establish that the delegation is not categorical
and unconditional. Thus, where Locke asserts that a person entering civil society undertakes to "submit to the determination of
the majority," otherwise the compact would "signify nothing,"
he goes on to add that the compact would "signify nothing, and
be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he was
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.

§ 97.
§ 129.

§ 131.
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in before in the state of nature.",6 7 Of course, if a person in civil society were under no other ties than before, the compact would signify nothing, but this is far from a statement of unconditional
delegation of right and power. And where Locke asserts that
where a person undertakes to be "regulated by laws made by society," he adds, "so far . . . as the preservation of himself and
society shall require. "68
In a passage to similar effect, Locke states that a person in
civil society "is to part ...

with as much of his natural liberty...

as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require. .".."69 This assertion obviously raises the further question

of how much of one's natural liberties does society require a person to part with when fulfilling these ends. The most important
conclusion is that the delegation of power and rights by the citizens of a civil society is not general and categorical; one need not
pay with all one's natural rights and powers to gain an admission
ticket to a civil society. Rather, any governmental assertion of
power must be justified by reference to the governmental purposes of achieving the peace and security of the citizens. No
doubt the extent of the delegation required to achieve these ends
will be considerable. But the presumption is not in favor of governmental authority, but rather, against it. 70 Because natural
rights are presumed to have been retained by the people unless a
basis for their delegation to the government can be specifically
demonstrated, this theory places substantial and general limitations on the power of government. Because the legislative power
is exercised, in Locke's political theory, by a democratically
elected majority, this limitation is, ipso facto, upon the power of
the democratically elected majority.
Locke is not at all mysterious or equivocal about the fact that
human natural rights and the natural law provide a check upon
the powers of a democratically elected legislature. He states
flatly that "the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men,
legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for other
men's actions must

. .

.

be conformable to the law of na-

Id. § 97 (emphasis added).
Id. § 129.
69 Id.
70 Governmental power is defined as the jurisdiction of a court of limited jurisdiction. Such a court has no general power, but rather only the jurisdiction which is
expressly granted to it from the source with the authority to confer jurisdictional
power. The presumption is against jurisdiction.
67
68
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ture ....

,
It is no exaggeration to say that the major task of
applied jurisprudence, under this doctrine, is to continually assess and reassess legal restrictions to determine when they exceed the permissible boundaries of tacit consent, and infringe
upon substantive natural human rights, which are always, necessarily, retained by the people, and can never be understood to
have been bargained away. There are difficulties in working out
in a practical context the institutions and mechanisms whereby
this assessment and reassessment will be accomplished. I must
reiterate that the traditions, conclusions and intentions of the
past can never be a valid source for present knowledge of these
matters, although these traditional sources can no doubt provide
guidelines, suggestions, and rules of thumb. But to claim "tradition" as a binding source for present conclusions as to natural
rights and obligations, is, as we have seen, the doctrine which
Locke takes greatest pains to refute.
D.

The Right of Revolution

An examination of Locke's discussion of revolution reinforces the above conclusions as to the limitations upon the power
of government, and the retention of natural rights in a civil society. The people have the right, according to Locke, to revolt and
overthrow the government whenever the legislature, or the executive "act contrary to their trust."7 2 A legislature acts contrary to
its trust "when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of
the people. 73
This passage has profound and far-reaching implications. It
establishes a standard of "non-arbitrariness" for all legislative action, and establishes that for a legislature to restrict liberty "arbitrarily," in and of itself amounts to an unauthorized violation of
its trust. In other words, this passage establishes a standard by
virtue of which legislative encroachments on human liberty and
property must be assessed and the standard points to reasonableness and rationality. This standard indicates clearly that the presumption is in favor of human liberty, and it is governmental
encroachment which bears the burden of demonstrating
rationality.
71 SECOND TREATISE, supra note 21, at § 135.
72

Id. § 221.

73 Id.
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BORK AND THE ORIGINALISTS

Introduction. The Concept of Interpretation

We will now look at the views of the originalists, especially
Judge Robert Bork, with respect to constitutional interpretation,
in the light of the above discussion of the views and intellectual
attitudes of the framers of the Constitution. It is useful first to
consider briefly the concept of "interpretation." We are examining the situation where the text of the Constitution does not specifically and unambiguously state whether a claimed individual
right or a claimed governmental right to regulate should prevail.
Because the Constitution does not explicitly answer the question,
we require some process for deciding how these competing
claims of right should be resolved and some principles on the
basis of which such resolution should be accomplished.
All that we mean here, and all that is generally meant by
"constitutional interpretation," is "the principles and process of
constitutional adjudication," and it would be well to keep this in
mind. Some originalists speak as if there is something shady and

unauthorized even about the act of interpreting the Constitution.
Merely by interpreting, some originalists believe we threaten to
commit the sin of abandoning the text of the document and the
intentions of the framers. Such originalists will permit interpretation, but only grudgingly, and only when done in moderation,
with great restraint and caution. 74 But it contributes to clear
thinking to regard interpretation not as a specific kind of activity,
capable of being practiced in different degrees, but merely as the
unavoidable process of constitutional adjudication, where competing constitutional considerations arguably point towards different results. If we look at the matter this way, we will not ask
useless and unintelligible questions such as: "How far is it permissible to go in interpreting the Constitution?" Rather, we will
ask useful and relevant questions such as: "What procedures,
principles, policies and values should be adopted in order to resolve competing claims of Constitutional right?"
B.

Originalism Generally

Originalism is the view that, in interpreting the Constitution,
we should be guided by, or, in a more doctrinaire version, bound
74 See, e.g., Joseph Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared,reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT

ed. 1990).

35, 41 (Jack N. Rakove
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by, the intentions of the framers of the Constitution. Professor
Rakove states: "Taken at face value, the idea of a 'jurisprudence
of original intention' simply holds that a judge interpreting the
Constitution or a statute should adhere as closely as he can to the
75
expressed ideas and purposes of its framers."
It is unclear what this means, or could possibly mean, and
our first task will be to try to discern what the originalists, especially Bork, mean by it. 76 In particular, it is unclear what it
means, in practice, to "adhere" to intentions and purposes, and
it is unclear how a judge is supposed to perform the necessary
task of adherence. Second, it is unclear what is meant by "intentions and purposes. 7 7 For one thing, we must know on what
level of generality we are to understand the expression "intentions and purposes," and we must know whether we are supposed to consider the probability that the framers had a
multiplicity of purposes and motivations in much of what they
did. Third, we need an account of the procedures we are supposed to use to determine the framers' actual intentions and
purposes, and what sort of evidence we are allowed to bring to
bear on this question.7 8
In theory, at least, originalism is, or ought to be, result-neutral. It appears to be formulated as a doctrine about how to perform the task of constitutional adjudication, not as a loaded
statement as to what the result should be. There is nothing
about originalism in principle which suggests that the claim of a
governmental right to prohibit or regulate a human action ought,
in general, to prevail over the claimed individual right. Presumably, one may fail to fulfill the framers' original intentions by finding a right to regulate where the framers would have found an
individual right, just as much as by finding an individual right
where the framers would have found a right to regulate. And
Bork, for one, insists that the doctrine is result-neutral in this
way.
But the plain motivation of most theorists who call them75 Jack N. Rakove, Mr. Meese, Meet Mr. Madison, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 179 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1990).
76 1 do not mean that there is anything unartful or misleading in Professor

Rakove's summary of the doctrine, but rather that it is unclear what the doctrine
itself could mean.
77 For an analysis of these concepts, see Dworkin, supra note 3, at 661.
78 For a discussion of this issue, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies andJurisprudence: Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L.
REV. 1045 (1990).
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selves original intentionalists is to deny that there is an adequate
constitutional basis for most claims of individual right and to defend the general right of governmental regulation against such
claims.79 One is led to suspect that "originalism" is not merely a
doctrine about the right way to interpret the Constitution, but
rather that the doctrine also embodies a substantive claim that, in
general, the framers intended claims of governmental regulation
to prevail over claims of individual right.
It is not logically impossible that the originalists consistently
apply their doctrine in a strictly result-neutral manner, and that it
just happens that recent courts, especially throughout the 1950's,
1960's and 1970's have consistently misapplied the procedures
and principles of interpretation in such a manner that they consistently err on the side of discovering individual rights that the
framers did not intend. But even this claim injects an inevitably
substantive dimension to the analysis of originalism, because the
originalists are making the claim that the courts have been led by
their flawed interpretive methods to violate the framers' intentions in one particular substantive way. 80
Originalism has thus come to be identified as a doctrine
about what the framers' substantive intentions actually were, and
not just a neutral doctrine about interpretation. Further, it is not
credible that the analytical method of the originalist scholars has
been to search diligently for the misapplication of interpretative
procedures, and upon finding such, to discover fortuitously that
it just happens that the substantive result Consistently is the erroneous acknowledgement of an individual right. It is clear that the
originalists' belief that the framers did not, in general, intend to
create individual rights is more fundamental than, and precedes
the conviction that, an interpretive procedure is being improperly applied, and just happens to be yielding a consistent pattern
of error.
In short, in discussing originalism, it is reasonable to consider the substantive issue of the framers' intentions with respect
to individual rights. Let us suppose that it could be shown that,
contrary to the view of the originalists, the framers actually did
intend a general commitment to human rights. If this were so,
79 Professor Graglia, for example, is unabashedly explicit about this. He writes:
"[Although the Constitution does create some individual rights, they are actually
rather few, fairly well-defined, and rarely violated." Graglia, supra note 74, at 39.
80 For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between political views'and
theories of constitutional interpretation, see Robin West, Progressiveand Conservative
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990).
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we would have to conclude that the principles of interpretation
defended by the originalists yielded errors as to the actual intentions of the framers, because the originalists repeatedly apply
their principles of interpretation, and arrive at the wrong result
(by hypothesis) as to the intentions of the framers. Therefore, to
whatever extent the originalists claim that the application of their
interpretive procedures and principles lead to correct conclusions as to the intentions of the framers, it is a sufficient refutation of the those principles and procedures to show that they
have driven the originalists to the wrong conclusions about the
framers' intentions.
C.

General Objections to Originalism

Many objections and obstacles to the very idea of basing
constitutional interpretation on the original intentions of the
framers have been proposed and widely discussed, and though
they will not be my major focus, I will survey briefly a few of
these objections and obstacles. How do we determine what the
intentions of the framers were with respect to a particular issue?
On what basis do we assume that the framers had any intention
whatsoever with respect to a particular issue? Even if we assume
that the framers did have intentions with respect to an issue, on
what basis do we assume that there was a single, univocal intention held collectively by the framers? Why should it be the intentions of the framers which are relevant to constitutional
interpretation, rather than the intentions of the ratifiers, who took
the necessary steps to bring the Constitution into force and
effect?
The originalists' usual first response to such questions is that
by merely asking them, the critic misrepresents the position being criticized. As one illustration, Justice William Brennan, offered the following objection: "In its most doctrinaire
incarnation, [originalism] demands that Justices discern exactly
what the Framers thought about the question under consideration and simply follow that intention in resolving the case before
them.""' Brennan goes on to opine that this view merely "feigns
deference" to the framers' intentions and that "it is arrogant to
pretend that ...

we can gauge accurately the intent of the Fram-

ers on application

of principle to specific, contemporary

81 See Brennan, supra note 8. See also TEMrTING, supra note 3, at 162 (quoting
Justice Brennan).
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Bork protests vehemently that Brennan is attacking a straw
man, and that no one actually holds the position he attacks.8 3
Bork acknowledges: "The requirement that the judge know what
the specific intention of the lawgiver was regarding the case at
hand would destroy all law . . .If they had to have such knowl-

edge, they could never decide. If such specific knowledge were
available, judges would never disagree with one another. ...
Bork concludes: "Justice Brennan demolished a position that no
85
one holds, one that is not only indefensible but undefended.
Aside from the fact that Brennan acknowledges that he is
describing the "most doctrinaire" manifestation of the originalist
view-a point which Bork, although he quotes the words, does
not mention-it is not so clear that no one holds this position, at
least in substance. Depressingly often, one hears repeated in triumphant tones what is surely the worst and most unsophisticated
constitutional argument ever conceived, to the effect that "the
Constitution does not contain the word 'X,' (or does not mention
'X' or refer to 'X'), therefore the Constitution has nothing to say
with respect to 'X' (for 'X,' substitute 'abortion,' 'privacy,' 'bussing,' 'affirmative action,' 'child labor,' 'minimum wage,' or
whatever you please). Thus, Professor Rakove, though not an
originalist himself, sets forth as one of the standard objections
offered by conservative critics to Supreme Court decisions of the
past three decades, that "the Court has acted improperly by establishing new rights that the written Constitution does not even
mention.
"86 To this preposterous argument that the Constitution applies to a matter only if it mentions that matter, it is a
completely sufficient response (as Bork acknowledges) that there
are many words the Constitution does not contain, for example
the word "truck," but no one doubts that the Commerce clause
may be interpreted to regulate interstate truck travel.8 7
Bork himself is not above invoking the absurd "Constitution
doesn't mention 'X' " argument. For example, in the course of a
vituperative polemic against the views of Professor Laurence
Tribe, Bork "clinches" his analysis of Tribe's discussion of a woman's constitutional right to an abortion with the words "[t]he
82 Brennan, supra, note 8.
83 TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 162.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Rakove, supra note 75, at 180.

87 TEMPTING,

supra note 3, at 202.
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Constitution now seems to contain another unmentioned right,
reproductive autonomy. "88

It is clear that the framers did not think about many of the
Constitutional issues which come before courts today for adjudication, and that the framers, therefore, had no specific intention
whatsoever with respect these issues. The most obvious literal
meaning of the term "originalism," once one acknowledges this,
is that in deciding a matter of constitutional adjudication, the result must be the one which the framers would have reached, or
most probably would have reached had they been deciding the
issue.
This interpretation of originalism is also obviously vulnerable to attack. How are we to decide what result the framers
would have reached? Lawyers and court watchers today have difficulty enough predicting how courts are going to resolve issues
that are current, widely discussed, and which stir passions now.
Why should we suppose that there is "a" result which the framers
would have achieved? Both historical evidence and our common
knowledge of human beings and human affairs tell us that the
framers did not speak, and could not have spoken, with one
voice. They were as divided in their opinions and attitudes as are
people of our time, although this division and diversity was limited for them, as for us, by the largely unconscious presuppositions and the climate of opinion which prevailed during the
period. And when we speak of the result which the framers
would have achieved, do we mean the result they would have
achieved had they been born in our own time with our education
and socialization? Or do we mean the result they would have
achieved if they had somehow been able to gaze from their own
historical and cultural perspective into our time?
Again, Bork acknowledges the force of these attacks and insists that this is not the position that originalists maintain.
Originalism, Bork argues:
[D]oes not mean that judges will invariably decide cases the
way the men of the ratifying conventions would if they could
be resurrected to sit as courts. Indeed, the various ratifying
conventions would surely have split within themselves and
with one another in the application
of the principles they
89
adopted to particular fact situations.
In the face of Bork's persistent strategy of insisting that critics
88
89

Id.
Id. at 163.
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of originalism misrepresent the doctrine and attack a straw man, it
will simplify matters to move on to a discussion of Bork's own account of originalism.
D.

Bork's Account of Originalism

Bork begins his account of originalism with a quotation from
Professor John Hart Ely: "What distinguishes interpretivism
from its opposite is its insistence that the work of the political
branches is to be invalidated only in accord with an inference
whose starting point, whose underlying premise, is fairly discoverable in the Constitution." 9 ' Bork endorses this with the words:
"In short, all that a judge committed to original understanding
requires is that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution
provide him not with a conclusion but with a major premise.
That major premise is a principle or stated value that the ratifiers
wanted to protect against hostile legislation or executive
action." 9 1
It is not so clear that Ely's term "interpretivism" means the
same thing as Bork's term "originalism," and that the difference
92
in terminology reflects only "current academic fashion,"1
although Bork is free to stipulate that he uses them in the same
way. The facial difference is that while Ely refers to an inference
whose starting point is "fairly discoverable" in the text of the
Constitution, Bork's method would allow the interpreter of the
Constitution to consider the "text, structure and history." Depending upon the sense in which Ely used the expression "fairly
discoverable," it appears that Ely's formulation refers solely to
the actual text of the Constitution, whereas Bork's method of interpretation attaches greater weight to external investigation.
But Ely did refer to a psychological process-an "inference"93
and described the text as the "starting point" for that process.
Ely intended, therefore, that ingredients other than the text are
necessarily involved in that process, and Bork summarizes these
ingredients as "structure and history." 94
Given Bork's identification of his view with Ely's, and his explicit reference to "structure and history," it is difficult to quarrel
with the doctrine that legitimate constitutional interpretation re90 Id.

at 162.

162-63.
Id. at 162.
Id.

91 Id. at
92
93

94 Id.
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quires a starting point fairly discoverable in the Constitution.
Bork's statement of his position, combined with the fair implications of his endorsement of Ely, yields a doctrine which actually
sounds quite moderate and reasonable. A premise in a constitutional argument is a "principle or stated value" the framers
wished to protect. It is not necessary that this principle or stated
value be explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but rather that
it be "fairly discoverable." It is fairly discovered by a process of
inference, which is accomplished by attending to the "text, structure and history of the Constitution."
But Bork's actual doctrine is not consistent with this statement of his doctrine. His writing, and the writings of other
originalists, is characterized by an attitude of profound ambivalence to the relevance of both the text of the Constitution, and
the principles and values which the framers intended to protect.
As we shall see, when it suits his purposes, Bork insists, in the
guise of a theory of interpretation, upon a literal reading of the
Constitutional text, ignoring extrinsic information which makes
clear the meaning of the text. 95 But when it suits his purposes,
Bork focuses entirely upon extrinsic information, to the point of
largely ignoring the clear meaning of the words.96
E. Bork's Underlying Moral Theory, as Expressed by His "Dilemma"
Argument
The basic difficulty with originalism is that the doctrine relies
at its heart upon a theory about the nature of moral reasoning
and moral analysis which the framers would certainly have rejected. Bork repeatedly asserts this moral theory in the form of a
dilemma: If a judge fails to look to the intentions of the framers
when performing constitutional adjudication, then it follows logically that the judge is merely imposing his or her own moral
predilections and preferences. That is, the judge either relies
upon the intentions of the framers or, if he fails to do so, it follows necessarily that he must be merely imposing his own preferences and values. Thus Bork writes:
Every clash between a minority claiming freedom, and a majority claiming power to regulate involves a choice between
the gratifications of the two groups. When the Constitution
95 See, e.g., infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth
Amendment).
96 See, e.g., infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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has not spoken, the Court will be able to find no scale, other
upon which to weigh the rethan its own value preferences,
97
spective claims to pleasure.
Bork goes on to say:
There is no principled way to decide that one man's gratifications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one
form of gratification is more worthy than another.... There is

no way of deciding these matters other than by reference to
some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective or
intrinsic validity of its own ....

Where the Constitution does

not embody the moral or ethical choice, the judge has no basis
other than his own values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the statute. 98
This is truly astonishing. Bork offers these conclusions, which
are so central to his theory of constitutional interpretation, without
defense, and without any apparent recognition of the extraordinary
complexity of the issues. The reason why Bork is so persuaded of
the force of his "dilemma" argument is that he presupposes, without argument or defense, a radically subjectivist moral theory, which
assumes that there is no basis other than the preference of the adjudicator, for deciding essentially moral questions as to the worthiness
of competing interests or gratifications. 9 9
Despite Bork's avowed intention to eschew moral theorizing,
his words constitute a moral theory, or at least a conclusory and
undefended assertion of a moral conclusion. Bork asserts, without
argument, that there is no principled way of deciding whether one
form of gratification is more worthy than another.' 0 0 If there were
such a principled way, then a judge could apply it when making a
decision, and we would no longer say that the decision was necessarily "unprincipled," and that it merely reflected the judge's personal
predilections. Then Bork would no longer be able to rely upon the
forced dilemma that a judge either follows the intentions of the
framers, or else necessarily asserts his own opinion.
It is especially outrageous for Bork to assert his particular
moral theory dogmatically, as if it were sufficiently supported by the
Neutral Principles, supra note 3, at 197, 203-04.
Id. at 204.
99 This article will examine Bork's Radical Subjectivism in more detail. See infra
notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
100 Bork's use of the language of "pleasure" and "gratification" in this context is
misleading and insensitive to the nuances of meaning involved. He obviously uses
the pleasure/gratification language to refer to the satisfaction of any interest whatsoever-a plain misuse of that language. But I will accept the terminology he
introduces.
97
98
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force of his own assertion. Bork does not merely assume without
defense a positive moral theory. Rather, Bork's theory asserts the
invalidity of all other moral theories that attempt to provide a principled basis for distinguishing one form of gratification as more
worthy than another. One would have thought that a theory of this
scope would have required several volumes in its defense.
The framers would not have accepted this forced dilemma. The
idea that the only two alternatives available to a judge who interprets the Constitution are either to follow the original intentions of
the framers or to impose the judge's own preferences and values,
would have been unintelligible to them. Bork's argument by dilemma presupposes that there are two, and only two, possible patterns of justification for the moral conclusion that a person does or
does not have a right to perform a particular action free of governmental prohibition. According to the dilemma, either this moral
conclusion is justified by its conformity to the views of someone else
(in this case, the framers) or, alternatively, the conclusion represents
nothing more than the opinion or prejudice of the person uttering
the conclusion. But, not only would the framers have rejected the
idea that these two alternatives are the only possible justifications
for a moral conclusion, they would have rejected both of Bork's alternatives as a possible basis for a moral conclusion. On the contrary, the framers would have believed that when one reaches a
moral conclusion about a human right, one is doing something
quite different from either recording the opinions of someone else
or setting forth one's own opinion, predilection, or prejudice. In
complete opposition to Bork, the framers believed that the doctrine
of natural rights supplied the necessary objectivist basis for the
moral conclusion as to the existence of a human right. We may disagree with the framers and reject their thinking, as the originalists
do, but the fact remains that the originalists are in the paradoxical
position of defending a "framers' intent" theory of interpretation
on the basis of arguments the framers would have categorically
rejected.
F.

Corollaries of Bork's "Dilemma" Argument
1.

The Argument from "Democracy"

Bork relies upon other undefended and unacceptable assumptions which are related to, or corollaries of his dilemma argument, based, as it is, upon the assumption that there is no
principled way of making a moral distinction among different
human gratifications. Except in a few narrowly drawn situations
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(i.e., those explicitly covered by the first eight amendments to the
Constitution), Bork argues that it would be "undemocratic" to
allow anyone other than a duly elected majority to decide
whether a. citizen does or does not have a particular right to be
free from governmental regulation.' 0 '
But the framers would have denied that this conclusion followed from the notion of democratic rule. Whatever the framers
thought about democratic rule, they believed that truth about the
universe did not vary with or depend upon a democratically chosen consensus. 0 2 Principles about human rights based upon natural law, in the framers' view, are no more subject to democratic
vote than scientific principles relating to universal gravitation or
the conservation of' matter and energy. To the framers there
would have been nothing undemocratic about recognizing that
matters of fundamental human right are outside the bounds of
majoritarian consensus and control.
2.

The Argument from the Capacity of Judges

Bork also argues repeatedly that judges have no more capacity to reach conclusions about values and policy choices than anyone else. Evidently this is not intended as an observation as to
the actual capacity of judges, but rather, as a way of making the
general claim that no one has any more capacity to reach conclusions about values and policy choices than anyone else, and that
judges are no different in this regard from anyone. This too is a
startling claim, although Bork vacillates between two different
meanings for it, which he does not clearly keep separate. In one
sense, the claim that judges have no more capacity to make value
101 See, e.g., Neutral Principles, supra note 3, at 201, 205, and passim. In Tempting,
Bork quotes his address, Traditionand Morality in ConstitutionalLaw, to the effect that
"[iln a constitutional democracy the moral content of law must be given by the
morality of the framer or the legislator .... The sole task of the [judge] is to translate the framer's or the legislator's morality into a rule to govern unforeseen circumstances." TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 11 (quoting Robert H. Bork, Traditionand
Morality in Constitutional Law, Address Before the American Enterprise Institute,
The Francis Boyer Lectures on Public Policy, Dec. 1984)). Bork sets up the following false alternative: "If this nation were starting from scratch, we might argue
about whether, as a general matter, judicial rule is to be preferred to democratic
rule." d. at 201. See also Lino Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared,reprinted in
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION, THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 37 (Jack N.
Rakove ed. 1990)("Constitutional limitations on popular government are undoubtedly undemocratic, even if they were themselves democratically adopted by a
supermajority"). This is precisely what the framers would not have thought.
102 Cf Gerhardt, supra note 3, at 1371 (discussion of the framers' view of democratic rule).
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choices is a claim about what judges are, or ought to be, entitled to
do under our governmental structure and institutions. In this
sense, the claim is not about the ability of judges to make value
choices. It is not a denial that some value choices are better than
others, or a denial that some judges may be able to make better
choices than some other people. Rather, its a claim that it is inconsistent with our democratic institutions to permit a judge
ever, under any circumstance, to make such a choice. I shall refer
to this as the "weak" version of the theory.
In this version, Bork's theory about the capacity of judges
may at least be intelligible, albeit implausible. When Bork defends the weak theory, he argues that the Constitution embodies
no commitment to any general set of values (apart from some
limited, particular provisions) which serve to guide judges with
respect to underlying moral goals and principles which the Constitution strives to foster. Bork further argues that the democratic institutions established by the Constitution require that all
value choices be submitted to majority vote and that under no
circumstance may a judge make such choices. This weak version
of the theory is almost surely unacceptable, and it surely was not
intended by the framers. As we have seen, it misconceives the
framers' understanding of a democratic society. Further, it is utterly implausible that the framers intended no general commitment to a general set of values. But at least the theory is on some
level coherent.
But Bork also defends a more radical version of the theory as
to the capacity of judges. In this second version (which I will
refer to as his "strong" theory), he contends that judges have no
more capacity to make value choices than anyone else for the reason that no value choice is any better or any more justified than
any other. As we have seen, Bork accepts both the strong and the
weak theories, and we will now investigate them further.
G.

Bork's Strong Theory as to the Capacity ofJudges
1. Bork's Radically Subjectivist Moral Theory

Bork's "strong" theory-that judges have no more capacity
to decide issues involving choices among competing gratifications because all gratifications are intrinsically equally worthy of
satisfaction-is a consequence of his assumption of a radically
subjectivist, or radically relativist moral theory. Radical moral
subjectivism (or relativism) is the view that moral utterances (e.g.
"This state of affairs is more valuable or more desirable morally

1992]

INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

745

than that") is, in reality, nothing more than an expression of the
preference of the speaker. It is the view that there is no objective or intersubjective sense in which moral utterances are valid.
It is the view that there is no objective moral basis for preferring
one person's moral claim to another person's. Values are indistinguishable from preferences. Like most radical moral relativists and skeptics, Bork both denies that he is one, and takes
positions inconsistent with his stated moral theory. This is not
surprising because his theory so conflicts with our basic instincts
and common sense that it is almost impossible to maintain
consistently.
Bork denies, in a casual paragraph, the charge that he is a
moral relativist or skeptic: "Nothing could be further from the
truth. Like most people, I believe I have moral understanding
and live and vote accordingly." 0 3 But this is no response whatsoever to the characterization of his view as radically subjectivist
or relativist. Of course, one presumes that Bork has "moral
views" in the sense that he prefers some values and policies over
others. But having such preferences is consistent with the belief
that statements of moral value are nothing more than expressions of the preferences of the person making the statement; that
is, having preferences is obviously consistent with a radically
subjectivist view of moral utterances, because to the radical subjectivist, a moral view is a preference.
His response to the charge that he is a radical subjectivist or
relativist reveals what Bork understands by the notion of a
"moral position," or a "moral view." Bork simply identifies,
without argument, a moral view with a subjective preference:
"Every clash between a minority claiming freedom from regulation and a majority asserting its freedom to regulate requires a
choice between the gratifications (or moral positions) of the two
groups."'' 0 4 In other words, a moral position is simply a preference whose fulfillment will cause gratification or pleasure. The
"argument" for this remarkable opinion is the set of parenthesis
marks which place the word "gratification" in apposition to the
phrase "moral position."
It is this undefended conclusion about the meaning of the
term "moral position" which lies behind Bork's bizarre analysis
of Alexander Bickel's hypothetical about the fiend who raises
puppies for the sole purpose of torturing them to death. By hy103 TEMPrrING,
104 Id. at 257

supra note 3, at 259.
(emphasis added).
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pothesis, the torture takes place on an island where no one has to
witness it. But most of us will be profoundly troubled by the
knowledge that this is taking place. Presumably, most of us agree
that it would be constitutionally permissible and morally obligatory to enact legislation prohibiting this practice (assuming, of
course, that the island is within the sovereignty of this nation).
At this point, Bork accomplishes an amazing sleight of hand.
He first generalizes the observation that we will be troubled by
the knowledge of the canine torture by saying: "Knowledge that
immorality is taking place can cause moral pain."'' 0 5 and, therefore, that "[m]oral outrage is a sufficient ground for prohibitory
legislation." ' 0 6 Bork then takes this principle as a broad, sweeping justification for prohibitory legislation. Take, for example,
consensual homosexual relations in private between consenting
adults. Are people troubled by the knowledge that this conduct
takes place? Well then, by definition, this conduct causes moral
outrage, and this moral outrage is just as deserving of legislative
protection as any other moral outrage-after all, there is no principled basis for choosing among gratifications. Society, according to Bork's logic, is therefore justified in prohibiting
consensual homosexual activity. To have a principle that will let
us protect the puppies, that principle must be broad enough to
allow us to prohibit homosexual relations, because there is no
basis for distinguishing the one "moral outrage" from the other.
Apparently it did not occur to Bork that one basis for distinguishing the two examples is that it might be that torturing puppies is immoral, while engaging in consensual homosexual
relations is not. Of course, Bork's moral theory, because it identifies a moral position with a subjective gratification, makes it impossible for him to entertain, or even to articulate, this
possibility. Further, because Bork identifies a "moral" view with
a subjective preference, there is no meaningful distinction, for
Bork, between "moral" outrage and any other form of outrage.
"Moral" outrage, insofar as Bork can use the term in any meaningful sense, is merely outrage that is intensely felt and deeply
troubling to the person. Bork has no basis upon which to discriminate between moral outrage, and any other form of outrage
on the basis of the objective content of the situation generating
the outrage. He not only does not deny this, but he takes great
105 Id. at
106 Id. at

258.
124.
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pains to insist upon it. That is the point of the story of the puppies and the homosexual conduct.
"Feeling outrage" is an activity guided by psychological, not
logical principles. There is no logical limitation upon the human
capacity to feel outrage. It is not only possible, but appears to be
the case, that some people feel at least as troubled and dismayed
by the knowledge that homosexual activity is taking place in private, as they do by the knowledge that animals are being tortured. Therefore, to Bork's "strong" theory, the reaction to
homosexual activity is as much moral outrage as the reaction to
the unfortunate canines, and there is no basis for favoring a statute prohibiting one activity to a statute prohibiting the other.
There is, in short, no distinction for Bork between moral outrage
and prejudice.
The reason why Bork's strong theory may fairly be characterized as "incoherent" is that it depends upon this fundamental
equivocation and confusion over the concepts of a "moral position" and "moral outrage." It sounds pious and commendable
to affirm that a moral person must accept that "morality" may be
legislated, and it appeals to our most basic emotions to invoke
the suffering of unseen puppies to support this. When we realize
that Bork slips in the implication of his theory that the "legislation of morality" simply means the legislation of the prejudices
of the majority, however, the theory loses some of its luster.
Bork asserts that there is "vast confusion" on this point,' 0 7 but
the only "confusion" involved in rejecting Bork's strong theory is
the "confusion" involved in entertaining the possibility that there
might be some basis upon which to make moral distinctions.
2.

Bork's Skepticism of Moral Theory Based Upon His
Argument from Lack of Universal Assent

The most fundamental and profound confusion inherent in
Bork's strong theory is his ridiculous notion that his theory (and
his theory alone) avoids and escapes the complexities and pitfalls
of moral reasoning, and that his theory alone provides a neutral
procedure for constitutional adjudication without having to make
any commitment to any unverifiable moral theory. No great philosopher, Bork argues, has succeeded in articulating a moral theory which has commanded universal, or even general, assent.
"Revisionist" theorists (by which Bork means essentially law
107

Id. at 123.
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professors who disagree fundamentally with him in print) are
merely "semiskilled moral philosophers."' 01 8 Therefore, it is unlikely that these "semiskilled" philosophers will "succeed where
for centuries, philosophers of genius have failed."' 09 Bork's conclusion is that it is futile, pointless, and perhaps intellectually dishonest even to attempt to make moral distinctions, or to reason
Bork,
about the grounds or justifications for moral judgments.
' 0
therefore, resolves "to give up reading this literature." "
This argument from lack of universal assent presupposes,
without defense, that "success" in moral philosophy is measured
only by reaching a result which is universally acceptable; and that
absent the possibility of a universally accepted result, the discipline of moral philosophy is futile and arid. Like so many of
Bork's undefended assumptions, this one should surely be rejected. Moral philosophy may perform many useful tasks even
without an expectation of achieving a universally accepted result.
Moral philosophy may assist in clarifying our thinking about the
meaning of normative terms in moral and non-moral contexts. It
may force us to reflect on the similarities and dissimilarities between moral judgments and ordinary factual judgments. It may
attune us to various "emotive," "non-cognitive" linguistic functions of moral language. It may force us to think about the principles underlying the moral evaluations which we in fact make, or
which are generally made by a society. It may force us to recognize respects inwhich our instinctive, automatic moral judgments
are inconsistent with each other, or presuppose conflicting principles which cannot both logically be true. It may force us to recognize logical implications of a theory which we claim to acceptimplications which we find troubling and which force us to reexamine our commitment to the theory. It may simply attune us to
thinking more consciously and systematically about the grounds
and reasons for our moral judgments; it may help us to think critically; to make distinctions; to perceive analogies and disanalogies; to recognize the difference in our own thinking between
reasoned judgment and automatic prejudice.
Without a doubt, Bork's challenge-that moral philosophy
should either put up (i.e., achieve universally acceptable results)
or shut up-raises profound and troubling issues about the nature of moral reasoning, and the meaning and justification of
108

Id. at 254.

109 Id.
I10 Id.at 255.
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moral judgments, which deserve to be taken seriously. But one is
tempted to suggest that Bork's defense of his moral views could
have been assisted by even semiskilled moral philosophizing.
Whatever the merits of Bork's skeptical challenge to the enterprise of moral philosophy, if Bork imagines that his moral theory
circumvents the messy business of moral theorizing by avoiding
commitments to any in principle unverifiable moral theory, he is
mistaken. Bork is addressing the moral question: How ought we
resolve conflicting claims of right in a situation where no constitutional provision explicitly addresses the situation? One possible response-Bork's response-is that there are no valid
principles upon which such situations can be rationally analyzed
and adjudicated, and, therefore, the only possible solution is that
the prejudices of the majority must control. As even a superficial
review of the philosophical background of the framers' era
reveals, this answer bears not the slightest relation to the answer
intended and established by the framers of the Constitution.
Bork's answer, furthermore, is a moral theory-that is, a theory
about the meaning and justification of moral claims. Not surprisingly, like all moral theories, Bork's is not universally accepted.
His moral theory has the same general characteristics, and raises
all the same problems and issues, as any other moral theory.
H. Bork's "Weak" Theory about the Capacity ofJudges
1. The Meaning of the "Weak" Theory
Bork's weak theory holds, in substance, that the framers intended no general commitment to human rights and that judges,
therefore, are not authorized by the Constitution to base a decision on a person's possession of an unenumerated right. This
claim that the framers intended no general commitment to
human rights is crucial to Bork and the originalists. If the framers did intend a principle underlying the specific provisions of
the Constitution to be a general affirmation of human rights and
human freedom, then anyone interpreting or applying the Constitution would be justified, indeed obliged, to consider that principle when interpreting and applying the specific provisions.
Correspondingly, anyone ignoring that principle or purpose
would be acting unfaithfully to the framers' intentions.
We must remember that all Bork requires for a process of
constitutional interpretation to be legitimate is that the interpretation proceed from a "principle or stated value that the ratifiers
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wanted to protect against hostile legislation.""' Further, it is not
necessary that this principle be explicitly asserted; rather, it is
sufficient that this underlying principle be "fairly discoverable"
in the Constitution through a study of its "text, structure and history." Bork's thesis, then, is that there is no general commitment
to human rights fairly discoverable in the Constitution through a
study of its text structure and history. We now turn to an assessment of this element of the "weak" theory.
The Impossibility That the Weak Theory Could Be
True
One's first reaction to the view that the framers did not intend a general commitment to human rights is amazement that
any knowledgeable writer could seriously assert it. The simplest
and most effective refutation is that it could not have been the
view of people who were seriously committed to the philosophy
of natural rights. Bork's view, in substance, is the that while the
framers may have enjoyed theorizing about abstract philosophical notions of natural right and natural law, when it came to the
serious enterprise of creating a nation and drafting a constitution, they decided that such principles were of interest as theories
only, and had no application in a practical context. Thus, according to Bork's view, when we interpret the Constitution, we may
ignore the evidence that the framers expressed belief in natural
rights, on the grounds that the framers specifically intended not
to embody that theoretical belief in the actual Constitution.
But Bork's view is a strict logical impossibility and the framers surely would have recognized it as such. To someone who
believes in natural rights theory "on a theoretical level," it does
not matter whether one explicitly asserts the existence of natural
rights in a constitution or not; human beings possess such rights
independently of whether anyone asserts or recognizes them or
whether anyone presumes to confer them. And to one who believes in the Lockean version of natural rights theory, a nation
which purports to exist without recognizing human natural rights
has no legitimate powers; the social order in such a nation is despotic, not a legal order at all. Hence, to one who accepts the
framers' natural law philosophy, it is logically impossible to assert the existence of a legitimate society, under the rule of law,
which does not recognize the fundamental existence of natural
human rights.
2.

I II Id. at 162-63.
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Bork's view, therefore, entails that either (1) the framers did
not really believe the natural law philosophy they asserted (despite the massive evidence to the contrary), or (2) the framers did
not intend to establish a legitimate society under the rule of law,
or (3) the mental powers of the framers were so limited that they
were unable to discern that it is logically impossible to accept
natural rights philosophy in theory, but to purport to abandon
that theory in practice. It would be interesting to know which of
these entailments Bork would defend. In my view, they are all
indefensible.
Although it was not necessary for the framers to explicitly
assert a general commitment to natural rights for it to be "fairly
discoverable" in the light of an examination of the "text, structure and history" of the Constitution, one would feel more comfortable if that commitment were explicitly stated in the
Constitution. Fortunately, it was stated, at least three times, in
terms that could hardly have been more explicit.
3.

Specific Refutations of the Weak Theory

a. The Ninth Amendment
The first, and most unequivocal statement of a general commitment to human rights is found in the Ninth Amendment,
which provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.""' 2 The meaning of this amendment is not
subject to reasonable dispute. The key word is "retained."
Human beings have rights which precede (temporally and logically) those explicitly conferred by this Constitution; they are the
natural rights possessed by all human beings independently of
human fiat. Specific constitutional provisions do not, and could
not, affect these rights.
Unfortunately, the plain meaning of this amendment is an
embarrassment to the originalists and their political agenda.
They are compelled, therefore, to assert that the amendment
does not mean what it says and they must go to considerable
lengths to contrive some other meaning. Bork at least recognizes
the force of the verb "retained" and realizes that he must find
some rights which people possessed before the enactment of the
112 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. For a recent comprehensive discussion of the Ninth
Amendment, see Sol Wachtler,Judging the Ninth Amendment, 59 FORD. L. REv. 1491
(1991).
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Constitution and some source from which these pre-existing
rights emerged. Bork locates that source about the only place he
could, namely in the individual states. His view is that the Ninth
Amendment was intended to reassure us that the federal Constitution was not intended to abrogate rights which had previously
, 3
been granted to citizens of the several states by state charters. ,

In defending this implausible suggestion, Bork states:
"There is almost no history that would indicate what the [N]inth
[A]mendment was intended to accomplish.""' 4 This is ludicrously untrue. The history that indicates clearly what the Ninth
Amendment means is all the history that describes the framers'
commitment to an essentially Lockean doctrine of natural rights.
Bork continues his defense by stating: "[N]othing about [the
Ninth Amendment] suggests that it is a warrant for judges to create constitutional rights not mentioned in the Constitution."' 15
This statement is a masterpiece of irrelevance and obfuscation.
There is no issue, as the framers thought about the matter, of
anyone-judges or anyone else-creating anything. Natural
rights exist independently of any form of government; neither
judges nor any other human being can "create" them. Almost
certainly, the framers did intend, through the division of powers,
that judges were to be charged with the responsibility of adjudicating competing claims of right between governments and individuals. But although the question of who is charged with this
responsibility is an important structural issue, it is not the central
issue. The point is that the Constitution requires a mechanism
for adjudicating claims of a governmental right to legislate
against a claim of individual right to be free from governmental
regulation. The creation of this balance is the central tension inherent in the form of government established by the framers, and
the adjudicatory function is the most essential function in realizing the form of society intended by the framers. The pseudoissue formulated in terms of whether judges have authority to
create rights is simply obfuscation.
113 TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 184. Two recent articles have argued that the
Ninth Amendment is to be interpreted in the light of the rights enumerated in State
Constitutions. See Calvin Massey, The Anti FederalistNinth Amendment and Its Implications for State ConstitutionalLaw, 1990 Wisc. L. REV. 1229 (1990); Rosen, supra note
11. Professor Rosen points out that most State constitutions include general commitments to human rights and argues that the Ninth Amendment refers, among
other things, to these provisions.
114 TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 183.
115 Id.
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Bork's phrase, "constitutional rights not mentioned in the
Constitution," is similarly meaningless when analyzed in the context of the framers' beliefs. The Ninth Amendment, itself, shows
that the Constitution embodies a theory of human existence in
which human beings possess natural rights. One whb understands the Lockean epistemological underpinning of this view
will understand that it is, in principle, impossible to give an exhaustive specification of these rights at any one moment in time.
The specification of these rights necessarily involves the contribution of the sense experience of the person who is performing
the task of attaining awareness of the content of these rights.
The fact that the Ninth Amendment embodies a general
commitment to natural rights is made clear when we consider the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments together." 6 The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."" ' 7 The crucial
words are "or to the people." Consider the logic of the Bill of
Rights. The first eight amendments grant specific protections
and rights to citizens. The Ninth states that these eight amendments do not exhaust human rights; people retain the rights they
had previously. But a question remains as to residual powers
which are neither granted expressly to the federal government
nor prohibited to the states. The Tenth Amendment could have
simply said that all such powers were delegated to the states. If
the Ninth Amendment meant what Bork asserts, then that is all
the Tenth Amendment would have needed to provide, and all
that it would have provided. In other words, if "rights retained
by the people" merely meant "rights previously granted by a
state," then it would have been sufficient for the Tenth Amendment to provide that any power not granted to the national government nor withheld from a state resides in the state. This
would be all that would be needed to assure that a state would
have the power to grant a right to a citizen which the federal
Constitution did not expressly grant.
But the Tenth Amendment would not have been sufficient in
that form, precisely because "right retained by the people" does
not merely mean "right previously granted by a state." The
Tenth Amendment makes explicit beyond reasonable doubt that
116 For another discussion of the interaction of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, see Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1431.

117 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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the framers did not intend that a state possessed all power
neither expressly granted to the federal government nor expressly prohibited to the states. Those residual powers beyond
the reach of the states (and the federal government) are the powers to invade the natural rights necessarily retained by the people. This is the only interpretation which makes sense of the
actual text of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers to
the states "or to the people." Powers are generally delegated to
the states except those powers which cannot be assumed by any
government because they would trespass upon natural human
rights.
In defending his conception of the Ninth Amendment, Bork
argues: "Surely if a mandate to judges had been intended [by the
Ninth Amendment], matters could have been put more
clearly."' I 8 And Bork offers several suggestions as to how the
amendment might have been drafted, such as: "The courts shall
determine what rights in addition to those enumerated here, are
retained by the people."" 9 But again, Bork completely overestimates the importance the framers placed on the issue of who performs the adjudicatory function. It may be that the framers felt
less strongly than Bork about the need to specify a precise mechanism for performing this function. On the other hand, it surely
seemed obvious to the framers that this function was assigned to
thejudiciary. When you create judges, their function is to judge.
The reason why Bork is driven to a totally disproportionate obsession with the powers ofjudges is his erroneous notion that the
framers would have regarded judges as being involved in the
"creation" of rights. While it may seem to Bork that a judge
"creates rights" when he engages in constitutional adjudication,
the framers thought otherwise. If the originalists understood
this, they would be less inclined to reject the obvious meaning of
the Ninth Amendment on the purported ground that the framers
could not have intended a grant of power to judges which the
originalists, on the basis of their own assumptions, consider excessive, but which the framers would have considered the ordinary function of adjudication.
To mirror Bork's argument, if all the framers had meant by
the Ninth Amendment was that states were free to grant rights
not granted by the federal Constitution, then it would have been
very easy for them to say so. There is another structural argu1] 8

TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 183.

119 Id. .
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ment which makes clear that this is not what that amendment
means. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments are obviously intended to be read together and to address the issue: "What about
rights and powers not explicitly mentioned in the federal Constitution?" The Tenth Amendment explicitly addresses the division
of power between the federal government and the states. It is
clear, therefore, that the intent of these two amendments was to
clarify the allocation of rights and powers among the national
and state governments and the people. Because the Tenth
Amendment explicitly allocates power to the states, it is a reasonable inference that had the framers intended to allocate rights to
the states in the Ninth Amendment, they would have done so
explicitly.
The meaning of the Ninth Amendment is plain, and to the
framers the point was obvious: Its essential purpose was to make
clear that some powers are beyond the reach of either state or
federal government. The only reason why the originalists are so
determined to deny its plain meaning is their misconceived and
anti-historical notion of the purported authority it gives judges to
"create" rights.
b.

The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments

The second major statement in the Constitution of the general commitment to human natural rights is the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment which provides: "No person shall
be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law. ....,,120 This amendment functioned as a restraint on the

federal government only. But in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Its purpose was to extend due process protection to acts of State governments. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment directly adopted the language of the Fifth, I will follow the convenient and common practice of discussing the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments jointly,
as if they were one clause.
The fundamental analysis of due process protection is familiar. Focusing on the "liberty" aspect of the clause, there is unanimous agreement that the Due Process Clause provides certain
(unspecified) procedural rights to someone who is threatened by
a loss of liberty by governmental action. But there is profound
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 1.
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and fundamental disagreement as to whether the clause also provides certain substantive protections; that is, whether there are
certain legal restrictions which the government is prohibited
from imposing on citizens because of the substantive content of
the restriction. Bork, and other originalists, and some who are
not originalists,12 ' argue vehemently that the Due Process Clause
may not legitimately be interpreted to afford substantive protection against governmental action. Thus, Bork writes that due
process "is simply a requirement that the substance of any law be
applied to a person through fair procedures by any tribunal hearing a case. The clause says nothing whatever about what the substance of the law must be."'122 He also states: "The [D]ue
[P]rocess [C]lause .. . is simply a requirement that government

not do certain things to people without fair procedures, not a
statement of what things may be done."123
A review of the vast literature on this topic is beyond the
scope of this article, but I believe that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments does impose substantive
restrictions upon the permissible legislative enactments of the
state and federal governments, and that this may be demonstrated with reasonable certainty by means of a rather simple argument. Those who deny that the clause embodies substantive
restrictions, and insist that the clauses impose "procedural" restrictions only, point to the word "process," and argue that this
word means essentially "procedure" and that the clause is limited accordingly. Thus Bork quotes Professor Ely to the effect
that "there is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows 'due' is 'process.' [W]e apparently need periodic reminding
that 'substantive due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of
like 'green pastel redness.' "124
The response to this is that the words which follow the word
''process" are "of law," and that the constitutional phrase is not
just "due process," but rather "due process of law." If one reads
the entire phrase, with the emphasis on the word "law," one will
be driven to a different, accurate understanding of the clause.
The framers' understanding of the concept of "law" differed fundamentally from our own. In our time, it has become automatic
to understand the term "law" in an essentially positivistic sense.
121 Professor Ely is an example.
122 TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 31.
123 Id. at 180.
124

Id. at 32.
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That is, we think of a law as an enactment by a determinate person or group of people with the authority and power to issue
commands and enforce them by sanctions. 2 5 Thus, it is natural
for us to assume that any command which is uttered, or any legislative directive which is enacted in a procedurally authorized way,
constitutes a law. We automatically regard the question whether
the law is wise or foolish, humane or cruel, as a separate, unrelated question-one which may be worth asking, but which is a
different issue from the question whether the command or enactment is or is not a law.
Bork gives an odd twist to the positivistic conception of law.
He writes: "When we speak of 'law,' we ordinarily refer to a rule
that we have no right to change except through prescribed procedures. That statement assumes that the rule has a meaning independent of our own desires."' 26 That statement also assumes,
of course, that a law is by definition something which is subject to
change by human fiat, and which we have a right to change, so
long as we do so through prescribed procedures.
But it is quite recently that this became the ordinary understanding, or the common sense of the matter, and this was not
the understanding or sense of the framers. To understand what
the framers meant by the phrase "due process of law," it is necessary, as I have stated, to focus on the word "law." What the
phrase is intended to state is that the processes and institutions
that are "due" an American citizen-that is, the processes to
which an American citizen is entitled-are lawful processes, not
tyrannical or despotic processes. As the framers understood the
matter, a governmental rule or command that trespasses upon
the rights to which a human being is naturally entitled in a rationally (or "lawfully") ordered society is not a process of law. Instead, the rule is a tyrannical or despotic process, or a
usurpation. In other words, to the eighteenth century mind, the
concept of law itself necessarily included a normative component
that it does not have for us today, and the substantive aspect of
the guarantee of due process of law is built not into the concept
of the "process," which is "due" to a citizen, but rather into the
concept of "law." The phrase "due process of law" is properly
understood not as a reference to procedures, in a narrow sense,
but rather as meaning "lawful, rational institutions."
Bork's treatment of the Due Process Clause is disingenuous
125 Cf JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED
126 TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 143

(1854).
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in the extreme. Bork plainly believes that the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted to assure the liberties-substantive liberties-of freed slaves. For example, Bork writes: "Federal enforcement of rights against the states came to seem important
only after the Civil War, when it became essential to guarantee
the liberties of the freed slaves against hostile Southern state
governments."' 2 7 And Bork agrees that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted for this purpose, stating: "The Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted shortly after the Civil War, and all
commentators are agreed that its primary purpose was the protection of the recently freed slaves."'' 28 But Bork's stated and vehemently defended view is that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment offers procedural protections only, not
substantive protections.
Why should we assume that those who enacted the Fourteenth Amendment intended to achieve the substantive result of
protecting the liberties of freed slaves by enacting a provision
which, in Bork's view, on its face fails to achieve this result? One
must also recall that Bork also argues that when speaking of the
framers' original intent, one refers not to the subjective content
of their minds, but rather to the objective intent as they expressed it in writing. Bork answers, in essence, that one must
assume in this case that this substantive result was achieved because this was the legislative purpose behind the adoption of the
Amendment. Again, one presses the question as to why those
enactors of the Fourteenth Amendment would have sought to
achieve that purpose by enacting language which (in Bork's view)
fails to achieve that result. At this point we have come full circle,
and Bork still has not responded.
Apparently Bork accepts that the Due Process Clause does
not mean what (in his view) it says, in at least one respect, because it embodies a substantive guarantee of the liberties of freed
slaves. At this juncture, one notices that the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."' 129 It does not say that
no state shall deprive anyfreed slave of life, liberty or property. So
is Bork driven after all to recognize substantive protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause? Bork answers, in essence,
"No.". The Amendment fails to mean what it says in this further
127
128
129

Id. at 93.
Id. at 180.
U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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respect: The reference to "any person" does not embody general substantive protections; those protections extend only to
freed slaves. It is only the procedural protections of the clause
which extend to all persons. In other words, some of the protections afforded by the Amendment extend as far as the Amendment says they do-the procedural protections-and some of the
protections do not extend as far as the Amendment says they
do-the substantive protections.
It would be simpler and more plausible to assume that the
Fourteenth Amendment means.what it says. Bork's doctrine that
it is the objective meaning of the words used by the enactors of
the Amendment which control, not the subjective content of
their minds, should lead him to the same conclusion.
It may have occurred to the reader that I am suggesting that
there is an analogy between the process of determining the nature and extent of natural rights for Locke, and the process of
determining the content and limits of substantive due process
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In fact, I am
suggesting not an analogy, but rather, an identity. The process
of fleshing out the nature and content of natural rights in a civil
society is precisely the task of determining the content and limits
of substantive due process rights under the Constitution. In deciding whether the Constitution guarantees a particular substantive right, as the framers would have conceived of the matter, the
judge must perform two essentially Lockean tasks. First, the
judge must come to understand whether the right claimed by the
individual is one which an individual possesses naturally.13 0 Second, the judge must determine whether the claimed right is one
which the individual has consented to cede to the government, or
rather one which the individual can never be understood to have
bargained away. This, as we have seen, requires an analysis of
the purposes and ends of civil government, and the purposes and
effects of the challenged legislative enactment, because the powers of government are not general and categorical, but rather,
3
limited by the natural purposes and ends of governments.' 1
c.

The Preamble to the Constitution

In the Preamble to the Constitution the framers set forth in
their own words the purposes and ends for which they established and ordained the Constitution. They wrote that they did
13o

See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text'

131 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
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so "in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity....
It would seem to be beyond
serious argument that if one is seeking to understand the intentions and purposes of the drafters of a document, then the drafters' statement of their intentions and purposes in that document
is relevant. But the position of Bork and the originalists is that it
would be unfaithful to the intentions and purposes of the framers
to consider their statement of their intentions and purposes in
the Preamble.
If this sounds like a caricature of his view-as Bork would no
doubt claim-it is not. Bork argues vehemently that the reference to "establishing justice" should be given no weight in constitutional adjudication on the grounds that it is "entirely
hortatory, and not judicially enforceable."1 33 Of course, the provision is hortatory. It is an exhortation to anyone who interprets
and applies the Constitution that one of the central, fundamental
principles and policies which underlie the document-so fundamental that it deserves to be set forth in an all-encompassing preamble-is the establishment of justice. Of course, it is true that
this provision does not specify precise guarantees or rightsrather, it is intended to apply generally and pervasively. The Establishing Justice Clause is intended to temper and mould the
application of specific constitutional provisions to particular circumstances as required. This is the plain and direct meaning of
the Preamble; it does not even deserve to be called an "interpretation" of it.
That Bork understands that this is the plain and direct meaning of the Preamble is clear from the fact that he does not even
attempt to interpret it away, as he did the Ninth Amendment.
Rather, he has no other recourse than to insist that it should be
ignored. Bork offers only the by-now-familiar refrain that "if [the
Establishing Justice Clause] states a criterion for judicial review,
every judge is free to decide which laws are just and which not.
Subjectivism is given free rein." ' 4 But, of course, this is not
true. Establishing justice is one among several purposes and
principles which a judge must balance and harmonize. And a
judge who strives to achieve a just result, even if this were the
132 U.S. CoNsT. pmbl.
133 TEMrING, supra note
134 Id.

3, at 35.
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only purpose and principle which he applied, would not, as the
framers understood the matter, merely be enacting his or her
1 35
own subjective opinion or preference.
Bork is inexplicably troubled by the fact that the Preamble
exhorts judges to keep in mind several, rather than just one, underlying principle and purpose when interpreting the Constitution: "Worse than that, there are any number of 'spirits' within
the Preamble itself: other stated purposes are... [Bork quotes the
other stated purposes]. That is a cornucopia of 'spirits' for a
judge to draw upon in making up his own Constitution."' 3 6
Again, interpreting a Constitution in the light of several interacting general policies and purposes has nothing to do with "making up" a Constitution. Beyond this, one is simply bewildered as
to why Bork thinks it is bad or "worse than that" for ajudge to be
exhorted to consider and balance interacting policy goals and
purposes. It is obvious, even if the framers had not explicitly so
stated, that this is precisely what constitutional interpretation
necessarily involves.
I.

Conclusions as to Bork's Strong and Weak Theories of the Capacities
ofJudges

Bork and the originalists misunderstand the framers in at
least two crucial respects. First, they imagine that the framers
would have understood that when a judge determines whether a
person's right to life, liberty or property extends to the right
claimed in a particular case, that judge is merely imposing his or
her personal preferences and predilections. As demonstrated
above, it is impossible to conceive of a more fundamental misunderstanding of the Lockean epistemology of natural rights. Second, the originalists imagine that in an essentially Lockean
political system, the members of the society give up and delegate
135 The ambiguous and troublesome concept of a "criterion" may contribute to
Bork's confusion here. In one sense a "criterion" is a sufficient condition, or sufficient indication, as when one says that litmus paper's turning blue, after contact
with a liquid, is a criterion of the liquid's alkalinity. But in another sense, "criterion" is used in the sense of "one of the factors or indicators of," as when one says
that "One criterion of a good education is knowing Latin." In this usage, knowing
Latin would be neither necessary nor sufficient for having a good education. If
Latin were all one knew, this would not be sufficient for a good education, and if
one knew enough other things, one could have a good education without knowing
Latin. In this sense, it is proper to say that attention to the requirements ofjustice
is one criterion, (and one criterion intended by the framers) of a sound piece of
constitutional adjudication.
136 TEMPTING, supra note 3, at 36-37
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their natural rights and powers categorically and without reservation. This is the most fundamental misunderstanding possible of
Locke's theory of political authority.
The originalists' view is that the rights retained by the members of this society are narrowly limited to those explicitly
granted by the government. In other words, the originalists understand this society to exist on an essentially Hobbesian rather
than on a Lockean model. According to the originalists' view,
once a civil society is created, the citizens cede all their power to
the government, and the government becomes the sole and ultimate source of rights; any rights retained by the people exist
solely by the explicit sufferance of the government. To say that
the originalists view the society on this essentially Hobbesian
model is not to say that their version of a civil society must be
cruel and tyrannical. Rather, it means that under their view, the
government is the sole source and grantor of rights; that
whatever powers and rights the person had in a "natural" state
are ceded to this government; and the rights which the person
possesses are those which are granted by the government. That
this is Bork's view of the matter is also demonstrated-not that
there is any doubt about it-by his dogged insistence that the
phrase "retained by the people" in the Ninth Amendment must
refer to the conferring of rights by some governmental source.
That the framers did not intend to enact a Hobbesian system, but rather a Lockean one, is made clear, as we have seen,
from an analysis of the "text, structure and history" of the Constitution, with special reference to philosophical background and
intellectual climate which prevailed when they worked. "The
common sense" of the era was Lockean; the intellectual giants
among the framers and founders explicitly acknowledged the
Lockean basis of their views; and the language of passages in the
Constitution, and other essential documents of the era, reflect
Lockean doctrine.
III.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTATION

Introduction

The views defended by Bork and the originalists are not only
fundamentally confused and muddled, but they are confused in a
dangerous and even pernicious way. These views attempt to do
away with the delicate balance, which the framers labored to

achieve, between the right of a government to act in the interests
of the peace and security of the citizens and the general right of
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individuals to be free of governmental control and coercion. In
place of the subtle vision of the framers, the originalists substitute their own preference for a society in which the powers of
government are essentially unchecked, except in a few narrow respects. which were explicitly and exhaustively set forth at the time
of the drafting'and enactment of the Constitution.
For their part, the originalists accuse those who disagree
with them of ignoring the actual Constitution so they may substitute their political and social preferences. Each side of this dispute accuses the other of choosing substantive social and
political results first, and adopting what purports to be a theory
about proper principles of interpretation only because the theory
makes it easier to achieve the desired results. Mutual accusations
of intellectual dishonesty are at the heart of this disagreement.
This may explain why, as Bork notes, these topics-have generated
remarkable levels of heated, even ill-tempered, dispute on both
sides. It would be interesting to consider whether it is possible to
say anything about principles of good and bad constitutional arresults which cergumentation independently of the substantive
3 7
generate.1
to
tend
tain forms of argument
Unfortunately, this may prove difficult. Apart from the fact
that Bork's "originalist" views are completely at odds with the
intentions of the framers, is there anything demonstrably wrong
with them? Ultimately, to reject Bork's thesis is to reject the kind
of society which it entails, and this is ajudgment of social philosophy, rather than of constitutional law.
I will discuss two cases which I believe contain some of the
worst constitutional argumentation to be found in the twentieth
century: argumentation which plainly does not fall "within the
range of the acceptable." In this way, we may attempt to discover
useful principles about what is acceptable. I refer to the majority
opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick 138 and the opinions by Justices
Rehnquist and Scalia in Cruzan v. Commissioner.'3 9 Obviously, the

challenge is to discuss the patterns of argumentation in these
opinions independently of the conclusions which they reach. I
will acknowledge at the outset that I find both the result and the
Bork observes: "The functions assigned to the [Supreme] Court impose a
need for constitutional theory..." and he asks rhetorically "How is the Court to
reason about the resolution of the disputes brought it? If we have no firm answer
to that question, it will not be possible to know, or even rationally to discuss,
whether judicial decisions are within the range of the acceptable." Id. at 140.
138 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
'39 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
137
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argumentation in Bowers to be appalling. On the other hand, I
can honestly say that in Cruzan, although I think I would have
reached a contrary result, I am more disturbed by the argumentation than the result. One of the reasons that I conclude that I
would have reached different results is precisely because I find
the principles of argumentation of the two opinions not only unpersuasive, but profoundly objectionable as constitutional reasoning. The blatant bias and intellectual dishonesiy of these two
opinions persuaded me of the contrary view. Both of these cases
have been widely discussed. I will summarize them only to the
extent necessary to illustrate the topics under discussion.
B.

Two Illustrative Cases
1. Cruzan v. Commissioner
a. Background

In 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan, a healthy, twenty-five year old
woman, was involved in an automobile accident which rendered
her unconscious and deprived her of oxygen for at least twelve
minutes. 140 This resulted in a profound coma-a persistent vegetative state. When it became clear that she had no chance of
recovery, her parents sought a court order to remove the nutrition and hydration tubes. 14 1 Applicable Missouri state law re-

quired proof by clear and convincing evidence that the
incompetent patient would have wanted the life-sustaining treatment terminated before a surrogate decision maker could obtain
an order terminating the treatment.'4 2
Cruzan's parents presented substantial evidence at trial that
Nancy Cruzan would have wanted the life-sustaining nutrition
and hydration tubes removed. 4 ' The trial court made the explicit findings of fact that Nancy Cruzan had stated that she
would not want to live as a "vegetable,"' 144 and that at age
twenty-five, Nancy had stated "in somewhat serious conversation
with a house mate friend that if sick or injured she would not
wish to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway
normally."' 45 The trial court concluded that these statements
suggest that "given her present condition she would not wish to
140
141

Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845.
Id.
Id. at 2852.
Id. at 2855.

142
143
144 Id.

145 Id. at

2846.
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continue on with her nutrition and hydration."'' 46
Notwithstanding this evidence, the Supreme Court of the
State of Missouri reversed the lower court's decision granting the
petition of the parents for leave to remove the feeding and hydration tubes. 14 7 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the lower
court had committed the legal error of failing to apply the "clear
and convincing evidence" standard required by Missouri law.' 48
Inasmuch as the lower court had failed to apply the applicable
legal standard to the evidence presented, especially where there
was reason to think, on the basis of the lower court's findings,
that the lower court would have held that the evidence was sufficient to meet the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, the
Missouri Supreme Court should have remanded to the lower
court to make this determination on the basis of the live testimony, subjected to cross examination. Instead, the Missouri
Supreme Court gratuitously reversed the lower court's findings,
on the basis of a paper record.
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether it was consistent with the United States Constitution for
the State of Missouri to require that an incompetent patient's
wish to reject life-sustaining medical treatment be shown by clear
and convincing evidence.' 49 The effect of this evidentiary standard is to stack the deck against the party seeking to terminate
the treatment by imposing a higher evidentiary burden on the
party seeking to establish that the incompetent person would
have wanted the treatment terminated.
b. Justice Rehnquist's Principal Opinion
A five to four majority of the Court affirmed, holding that
Cruzan's acknowledged constitutional right to decline treatment
did not overcome the State of Missouri's countervailing interests
in enacting its heightened evidentiary requirement.' 50 As Justice
Id.
Id. at 2855.
Id. at 2846.
149 This formulation is a compilation of several statements by the Court of the
issue as it conceived it. See, e.g., id. at 2846, 2851, and passim. An alternative formulation of the issue might have been as follows: May a State constitutionally usurp,
by enacting a heightened and burden-shifting evidentiary standard, a person's right
under the United States Constitution to refuse medical treatment, in the face of
her expressed wishes to decline such treatment, and the unanimous consent of her
family and loved ones, her physicians, and her court-appointed guardian ad litem
that such treatment should be discontinued?
150 Id. at 2856.
146
147
148
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Rehnquist's principal opinion, and Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion viewed it, this was a simple case. The principal opinion
acknowledged that Nancy Cruzan had a liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment to refuse medical treatment.' 5 ' But the
Court held that this interest was overcome by the general state
52
interest "in the protection and preservation of human life'
and the Court observed: "there can be no gainsaying this interest."' 53 How do we know that the state has an interest in life
sufficiently broad to encompass this situation? The heart of the
opinion is this simple-minded response: "[T]he States-indeed,
all civilized nations--demonstrate their commitment to life by
treating homicide as serious crime. Moreover, the majority of
States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties on
one who assists another to commit suicide."' 54
When considering issues involving human rights, Locke cautioned us against reasoning that was "carelessly indifferent,"
"idle and listless" or "corrupted by vice." It is difficult to imagine constitutional reasoning which is more careless; more indifferent and insensitive to emotional and moral considerations;
and more corrupted, if not by vice, then by personal bias and
predilection, than this opinion. The case presents profoundly
difficult, novel and troubling issues concerning the legal, moral
and metaphysical status of a person who is neither dead, nor fully
alive-a person who bears some of the indications of both
states.' 55 The Court's pattern of reasoning is the very paradigm
of intellectual carelessness and moral indifference: Is Cruzan
alive? Yes. Will the intentional act that the petitioners seek to
perform proximately cause her death? Yes. Well, this is by definition homicide, and therefore it is obvious that the state's interest in preventing homicide must prevail.
But this will not do; it is argumentation which, given the issue and the circumstances, is not within the realm of the acceptable; and this conclusion is demonstrable, I believe, without
reference to the result. The essence of the legal and moral ques151 Id. at 2851 n. 7.
152

Id. at 2852-53.

153 Id. at 2852.
154 Id.

155 Nancy Cruzan was clearly alive, in some sense. Certainly under none of the
legally recognized criteria-cardio-pulmonary, or electro-encephalographic-was
she dead. Her heart and lungs were functioning, and she gave evidence of some
brain activity. On the other hand, there is a deeper, metaphorical sense, in which
one might say that her condition was not really, or essentially, life.
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tion presented is whether this act of intentionally bringing about
the death of another person is sufficiently like the typical instance
of causing the death of another person to be controlled by the
general rule against homicide. That is, the question presented is
whether the legal and moral principles which would apply to
most living human beings apply a fortiori to Nancy Cruzan, or
whether her situation calls for a more sensitive and discerning
legal and moral analysis.1 56 If nothing else, this question is unavoidably difficult and profound. Where the essence of the case
is whether this act of bringing about the death of a person is sufficiently like an ordinary act of homicide to be controlled by the
general rule against homicide, then to ground a decision on a
mere repetition of the general rule against homicide is to ignore
the real issue.
To confront the case, rather than to beg the question by citing a general rule, the Court would have to recognize that the
term "life" refers to a wide range of dissimilar states of existence
ranging, at one extreme, from the healthy, intelligent, vital tenyear old girl Nancy Cruzan once was, to the persistent vegetative
state which she eventually entered. The progress of technology,
which conferred the dubious benefit of allowing her to enter that
state, should force us to recognize that distinctions must be made
as to the legal and moral consequences that flow from the various
states of human existence comprehended under the heading
"life." But the Court contents itself with the offhand remark that
"a [s]tate may properly decline to make judgments about the
'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply
assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human
life... ."" One might have thought that the Court was comparing a life with, and without, a persistent toothache.
From the fact that a state possesses a legitimate and strong
156 There is an obvious refutation of the Court's afortiori argument. The Court
acknowledges that Nancy Cruzan has a constitutionally based right to reject medical treatment, that is, a right to consent to action by others which would result in
her death. But there is no legal right to consent to homicide. This shows immediately that Cruzan's situation, like the situation of any medical patient, is different
from the general case where a person performs or omits an.action which results in
the death of another. It shows that general truths about societal interests in life do
not apply afortiorito Cruzan. Presumably this is why Justice Scalia, as we shall see,
pretends as if the voluminous law establishing a right to reject medical treatment
does not exist. He wants to argue that for Cruzan to reject life-sustaining medical
treatment is just like any other instance of consenting to suicide. He can make that
bizarre argument only by ignoring all the law relating to consent to medical treatment which flatly refutes his view.
157 Id. at 2853.
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interest in many of the variations of human existence that we call
"life," it does not follow that the state has a similar interest in all
such variations. To the extent that the Court's reasoning is
based on this fallacious argument, the Court errs, and it errs in a
particularly careless, blatant, and elementary way.' 58
The Court's argument for what it asserts to be a general
state interest in preserving life, displays a mode of argumentation
which is to start from a definition or a general rule and apply it
mechanically to a particular situation without serious consideration of the reasons why it may or may not apply to that situation.
What are the grounds or bases for a state interest in the preservation of life? One cannot know whether the general rule comprehends the novel and unique situation of Nancy Cruzan until one
has seriously considered and analyzed this question. Surely the
answer must include such considerations as the following: 1)
Most living human beings have the capacity for some form of
pleasure, happiness and enjoyment, and to the extent that society's interests are made up of the individual interests of its members, the experiences of each member are a component of the
whole; 2) Each individual generally has the capacity to engage in
activities which benefit and contribute to the well-being of other
members, and to society as a whole, and society has a legitimate
interest in securing such benefits; and, 3) It is crucial to the wellbeing of society that its members think of human life seriously
and reverently, understanding that the taking of a human life may
be done only with the greatest justification, and upon serious deliberation and reflection.
Perhaps the Court could have argued cogently that one of
these state policies could be furthered by a rigid application of a
general rule against homicide to Nancy Cruzan's situation. But
whether this is so or not, the Court's offhand argument from a
general state interest in life to its application in this case does not
adequately confront the issue.
In what respect, if any, does the Court attempt to address
158

Cf Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice'Stevens asserts:
Missouri insists, without regard to Nancy Cruzan's own interests,
upon equating her life with the biological persistence of her bodily
functions ... [T]he Court errs insofar as it characterizes this case as
involving 'judgments about the 'quality' of life that a particular individual may enjoy . . . [Flor patients like Nancy Cruzan . .. there is a
serious question as to whether the mere persistence of their bodies is
"life" as that word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.
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the actual case before it? The Court asserts that "[w]e think it
self-evident that the interests at stake in the instant proceedings
are more substantial, both on an individual and societal level,
than those involved in a run-of-the-mine civil dispute."'159 One
imagines that at last the Court will seriously confront the psychological and emotional realities of this situation from the point of
view of the human beings who have a genuine stake in the outcome-the parents and loved ones of Nancy Cruzan. But, mysteriously, what the Court finds instead is a heightened power on
the part of the State of Missouri to ignore the past expressed
wishes of Nancy Cruzan, and the present wishes of her parents
and loved ones. The Court, for example, asserts:
[I]n the context presented here, a State has more particular
interests at stake. The choice between life and death is a
deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality. We believe Missouri may legitimately seek to safeguard
the personal element of this choice through the imposition of
heightened evidentiary requirements.' 6 0
The Court acknowledged that this heightened evidentiary standard placed on the party seeking to terminate treatment an increased likelihood of bearing the burden of an "incorrect"
decision. 6 ' The Court even acknowledged that "Missouri's re-

quirement of proof in this case may have frustrated the effectuation
Court called] the not-fully-expressed desires of Nancy
of [what the
2

Cruzan."

6

1

This asymmetric allocation of burden was justifiable, the Court

concluded, because of the consequences, as the Court viewed them,
of an erroneous decision in each direction. An erroneous decision
to terminate treatment is "not susceptible of correction," 163 the

Court reminds us; but the Court insensitively dismisses the consequence of an erroneous decision not to terminate as merely the
"maintenance of the status quo."' 64 The Court lists the supposed
virtues of maintaining the status quo as "the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science, the
159
160
161
162

Id. at 2854.
Id. at 2852-53.
Id. at 2854.

164

Id.

Id. The Court responded cryptically that "the Constitution does not require
general rules to work faultlessly; no general rule can. Id. But the issue here has
nothing to do with whether a rule works "faultlessly." Id. The question is whether
the Missouri statute, as interpreted, gives sufficient weight to Nancy Cruzan's Constitutional right to reject medical treatment.
163 Id. at 2854.
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discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in
the law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the
administration of life-sustaining treatment . . ."65 and the Court
also states that the occurrence of any of these possibilities "create[s]
the potential that a wrong decision will eventually be corrected or its
impact mitigated."' 6 6
The Court did not even find it necessary to raise the issue of the
emotional and moral burdens which the status quo imposes on the
human beings involved. Surely the Court has an obligation at least
to articulate and consider the following sorts of considerations: For
most people a seemingly endless, unresolved limbo is the most
painful, stressful and intolerable situation imaginable. As long as
the status quo is maintained, Nancy Cruzan's parents will be in this
limbo, unable to free themselves from the past, unable to begin the
emotional healing process which will enable them to resume their
own lives. It is a reasonable supposition that few of us would desire
to be maintained in a persistent, vegetative state, but that most of us
have a strong interest in being remembered as healthy and vital,
rather than as a pathetic caricature of a human being. Every week,
month and year that the status quo continues, the memory of Nancy
Cruzan as she really was fades and weakens, to be replaced by and
associated with feelings of pity, tragedy and horror. Thus, not only
do her parents have an interest in being spared this state of limbo,
but Nancy Cruzan herself has an interest in the kinds of images,
recollections and associations which her life imprints on those who
67
loved her and cared for her.'
If anything qualifies as "careless" or "indifferent" reasoning,
then surely it is the Court's argument that it would "correct or mitigate" the impact on her loved ones of an erroneous decision to continue treating Nancy, if she were to die unexpectedly after weeks or
months more of lying inert as a grotesque caricature of a human
being. It is simply intellectually careless or dishonest for the Court
to present this argument without a serious consideration of the
meaning and significance of the status quo.
It cannot reasonably be denied that the Court's reasoning is
"corrupted" by a preconceived bias in favor of the State of Missouri
as a decision maker in this case. The Court's arguments cannot be
rationalized even on the basis of a misguided constitutional theory
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Cf

id. at 2868 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A quiet, proud death, bodily integrity intact, is a matter of extreme consequence.").
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which holds that power resides generally with the states, and human
rights are limited to those which have been narrowly and specifically
conferred by human fiat. Consider the Court's statement that the
State of Missouri may "safeguard the personal element of the
choice"' 68 by stacking the deck against the patient and her loved
ones. The outcome of Missouri's front loading of the result is that
the state, not the patient or the parents, will make the decision.
Even if this outcome is defensible on some grounds, it is plain intellectual dishonesty or carelessness to refer to this as "safeguarding
the personal element of choice," because there is nothing "personal" about the State's making the decision.
The Court's references to Cruzan's parents are at best condescending, at worst contemptuous. The Court does describe them as
"loving and caring parents."'

69

But they are unsuitable decision

makers because they:
[M]ay have a feeling-a feeling not at all ignoble or unworthy,
but not entirely disinterested, either-that they do not wish to
witness the continuation of the life of a loved one which they
regard as hopeless, meaningless, and even degrading. But
there is no automatic assurance that the view of close family
members will necessarily be the same as the patient's would
have been had she been confronted
with the prospect of her
70
situation while competent.
These observations, I submit, could be made only by someone
whose reasoning was clouded by carelessness or indifference, or
who had decided the issue without reasoning seriously about it at
all, that is, whose reasoning was corrupted by bias. Of course there
is no "automatic assurance" that the view of close family members
will be the same as the patient's would have been. But the "automatic assurance" standard is plainly unreasonable, and the Court
could have asserted it only to guarantee that family members will
never make the decision, because the standard is inherently incapable of being satisfied. But apparently the same standard does not
apply to the party who will actually make the decision, the State of
Missouri, because there is no "automatic assurance" that its decision will match what the patient would have decided, and the standard is equally unreasonable in either case. The "automatic
assurance" standard, therefore, provides no basis for preferring one
168 Id. at 2852-53.
169
170

Id. at 2855.
Id. at 2855-56.
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decision maker over another, and it can only be careless, indifferent,
or corrupt to argue that it does.
It is also true that a decision by family members would not be
"entirely disinterested," and it is probably true that the State would
be a more qualified decision maker on the basis of the "disinterestedness" standard. But the Court does not adequately defend "disinterestedness" as an appropriate standard. Apparently the Court
considers it a dangerous possibility that loved ones will consider
feelings and human values in making the decision, and the Court
implies that Nancy Cruzan needs the calm and rational hand of the
State of Missouri to champion her interests against her parents,
whose reason and judgment are likely to be clouded by ambivalent
feelings.
The Court's opinion displayed bias and carelessness as well in
its treatment of the evidence presented at trial as to Nancy Cruzan's
wish that she not be kept alive in a persistent vegetative state. The
Court upheld the conclusion of the Missouri Supreme Court that
the evidence was not sufficient to meet the applicable "clear and
convincing evidence" standard, on the grounds that "[Nancy
Cruzan's] observations did not deal in terms with withdrawal of
medical treatment or of hydration and nutrition." 171 In other
words, Nancy Cruzan's failure to use the specific terms "nutrition,"
"hydration" and "withdrawal of medical treatment," and presumably her substitution of the word "vegetable" for the term "persistent vegetative state," convinced the Court to refuse to give effect to
her expressed wishes pursuant to her acknowledged constitutional
right. If the Missouri statute requiring clear and convincing evidence is interpreted as the Court interpreted it, to require not only
evidence that the patient expressed her wishes, but also that she correctly used specific medical terminology, then the statute makes a
mockery of the patient's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. Again the conclusion is inescapable that the Court picked an
interpretation of the statute which would assure that the State of
Missouri would prevail as decision maker. At the very least, this gratuitous interpretation of a Missouri statute is a task which the federal
courts, even the Supreme Court, has no business performing.
We should remember that the only court which heard the evidence held that the petition to terminate the life support systems
should be granted.' 72 The Supreme Court still had the opportunity
to correct the Missouri Supreme Court's gratuitous injection of its
171
172

Id. at 2855.
Id. at 2846.
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view of the facts by ordering the case remanded to the trial court in
order to determine whether the evidence presented of Nancy
Cruzan's wishes met the clear and convincing evidence standard.
c. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Whereas the principal opinion focuses on the state's interest
in preserving life, Justice Scalia's concurring opinion focuses on
the other side of the same coin-the state's interest in preventing
suicide. Scalia first announces that "American law has always accorded the State the power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures
necessary to preserve one's life.... ,,17 He then rejects the wellestablished constitutional right to reject medical treatment by asserting that "no substantive due process claim can be maintained
unless the claimant demonstrates that the State has deprived him
of a right historically and traditionally protected against State interference .... [T]hat cannot possibly be established here."' 74
The remainder of Scalia's opinion is devoted to arguing for
the proposition, as astonishing as it may seem, that there is nothing different or distinctive about this case to suggest that it would
be anything other than an ordinary case of suicide for Nancy
Cruzan to choose the removal of her life support systems. Scalia
quotes Justice Brennan's statement in his dissenting opinion that
the state "has no legitimate general interest in someone's life
completely abstracted from the interest of the person living that
life, that could outweigh the person's choice to avoid medical
treatment." 75 Scalia responds that:
One who accepts [this] must also accept... that the State has
no such legitimate interest that could outweigh 'the person's
choice to put an end to her life .... [I]nsofar as balancing the
relative interests of the State and the individual is concerned
there is nothing distinctive about accepting death through the
refusal of 'medical treatment,' as opposed to accepting it
through the refusal of food, or through the failure to shut off
the engine and get out of the car after parking in one's garage
after work." Suppose that Nancy Cruzan were in precisely the
condition she is in today, except that she could be fed and digest food and water without artificial assistance. How is the
173 Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's concurrence is discussed in
Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
U. CHi. L. REV. 1057, 1093-94 (1990).
174 Cnzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859.

175

Id. at 2862.
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State's "interest" in keeping her alive thereby increased, or
her interest76 in deciding whether she wants to continue living
reduced? 1
This is preposterous, but the problem, as always, is whether this
can be conclusively demonstrated. Two aspects of Scalia's thinking
combine here to lead him to his conclusions. The first is his acceptance of an essentially "originalist" doctrine about the meaning and
interpretation of the Constitution. On the question of Nancy
Cruzan's right to reject medical treatment, Scalia states that "the
Constitution has nothing to say about the subject. To raise up a
constitutional right here we would have to create out of nothing (for
,-7.7
it exists neither in text nor tradition). ....
The second aspect of Scalia's thinking here is a dogged refusal
to analyze and to make distinctions. The answer to the rhetorical
question with which Scalia concludes the above quotation is to
think, and to analyze and answer it. One line of reasoning which
might be "within the range of the acceptable," might go as follows:
Scalia asks us to posit a hypothetical situation which is in "all respects" like Nancy Cruzan's actual situation, "except that she could
be fed and digest food and water without artificial assistance." But
is this hypothesis even possible? Might it riot be the case that the
ability to take food and water without artificial assistance necessarily
evidences a sufficiently higher level of brain activity that someone in
that condition would necessarily be more likely, eventually, to make
further recovery and to experience further improvements in brain
functioning? And if that were the case, might there not be a legitimate basis for saying that the interest of the state in continuing that
variation of existence is augmented. And even if this is not so,
might there not be some basis for arguing that the state has a higher
interest in the continuation of the life of someone enjoying the
higher level of brain functioning.
Other lines of reasoning, whether or not they reach conclusions
with which I agree, would also be within the realm of the acceptable.
But what is not acceptable is to refuse to reason, to ignore issues
and distinctions, to refuse to question one's pet theories and generalizations, even in the face of instances which challenge and threaten
them.
Scalia looks at Nancy Cruzan in a persistent, vegetative state,
compares her with a hypothetical Nancy Cruzan who sits in a closed
garage with the motor running after coming home from work de176

Id. at 2862.

177 Id. at 2863 (emphasis in original).
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pressed, and sees no difference. The legal commentator, of course,
has the duty to make clear that what Scalia means is that he sees no
difference relevant to the constitutional interpretation of the situation, on the basis of constitutional doctrine which he accepts. To
Nancy Cruzan's parents, however, Scalia's analysis (or non-analysis)
is simply cruel and vicious in its effect. From their point of view,
they are being told that by acquiescing in their daughter's wish that
her life end under her present circumstances, they are acting no differently than they would be if they passively allowed her to set up a
hose to gas herself in a garage while she was healthy. At a certain
point, when one's pet constitutional theory yields conclusions which
are sufficiently intellectually absurd, and morally repulsive, it is time
to consider questioning the theory.
B.

Bowers v. Hardwick

In Bowers v. Hardwick, a homosexual man who had been arrested and charged with violating a Georgia statute criminalizing
"sodomy," brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
that statute. 178 The Statute makes no distinction between homosexual and heterosexual "sodomy."' 79 A heterosexual couple
were originally joined as plaintiffs to the action, but their claims
were dismissed on the grounds that they lacked standing to maintain the action because "they had neither sustained, nor were in
any immediate danger of sustaining, any direct injury from the
enforcement of the statute ..."'180 The Court, therefore, stated
that it was considering the statute only insofar as it related to
homosexual "sodomy" and took no position on the statute as it
related to heterosexual activity.'
The ruling on the standing
issue makes it clear that the statute is interpreted in a discriminatory way, because one violator was arrested, and other violators
or potential violators are deemed to have no danger of having
the statute enforced against them.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the
Georgia statute was unconstitutional because it violated a fundamental right of "private and intimate association that is beyond
the reach of state regulation by reason of the Ninth Amendment
178
179

478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).

Id. at 188 n. 1. The Georgia sodomy statute provides, in pertinent part:
"[O]ne commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another ..
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Harrison 1984).
180 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 180 n.2.
181 Id.
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and the Due Process Clause.... 182 The Supreme Court, in a
five to four opinion, reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that
the State of Georgia could constitutionally forbid Hardwick from
engaging in his chosen sexual activities.' 8 3
The principal opinion by Justice White and two concurring
opinions by Justices Burger and Powell all held that the issue
presented was whether the Constitution conferred a right to engage in homosexual sodomy;' 8 4 they concluded that it did not.
Among the several things wrong with the Court's conception of
the issue, it ignores the plain text of the Statute, which was not
limited in its application to homosexual activity.' 8 5
The issue, rather, is whether Georgia enacted an unconstitutional statute; the issue is not defined by the fact that Georgia
makes distinctions (probably unconstitutional distinctions)
among the people it arrests and charges with violating the statute.' 8 6 Suppose, for example, that Georgia enforced the statute
only against poor people. Would the Court have argued that the
Constitution contains no provisions about the rights of poor people to choose their own sexual activity, and therefore that this
must be a constitutionally fit subject for governmental regulation? If one interprets a statute to apply only against a narrow
class of violators, it should come as no surprise that the Constitution contains no precise language referring expressly to that narrow class. The issue as identified by the Court demonstrates
again both the absurdity and the extraordinary seductiveness of
the argument of the general form: "The Constitution doesn't
mention 'X;' therefore, it contains no provision relating to 'X.'"
The Supreme Court is permitting a state to insulate its statute
from constitutional scrutiny by the simple device of interpreting
it in an unconstitutionally discriminatory way.
In proceeding to the merits of the action, the Court acknowledged grudgingly that although "the . . . Due Process [Clause]
...appears to focus only on the processes by which life, liberty,
or property is taken, the cases are legion in which [that Clause
has] been interpreted to have substantive content.... 187 The
Id.
Id. at 189.
Id.
For an interesting discussion of the problem of selecting the appropriate level
of generality to describe an issue, with specific reference to Bowers, see Tribe and
Dorf, supra note 174, at 1065.
186 Cf Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
187 Id. at 191.
182
183
184
185
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Court also complains that "[a]mong such cases are those recognizing rights that have little or no textual support in the constitutional language."' 8 8
Two principal tests have been used historically to identify
the boundaries of the substantive rights guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause. The Court identifies these two tests as follows:
In Palko v. Connecticut, ' " it was said that this category includes those fundamental liberties that are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed." A different description of fundamental liberties appeared in Moore v. East
Cleveland "... where they are characterized as those liberties
that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
188 Id. The Court rejects Hardwick's argument that a line of cases including Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its progeny create a right of privacy
sufficiently general to include the activities prohibited by the State of Georgia, and
the Court asserts that "No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on
the one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated, either
by the Court of Appeals or the respondent." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
If the Court is suggesting that the right of privacy articulated in Griswold was
limited to situations involving "family, marriage or procreation," that interpretation flies in the face of the much more general language of Griswold. Justice Douglas's famous language of penumbras and emanations was unfortunate and badly
chosen. The Justice stated: "[The] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life
and substance .... Various guarantees create zones of privacy." 381 U.S. at 483.
Ever since Justice Douglas wrote these words, it has been easier to make fun of the
metaphor than to appreciate the substance and importance of the doctrine it set
forth. But the same point can be made in less colorful language: A person can fully
enjoy the rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights only if clusters of related rights are
also acknowledged. These clusters of rights, or "zones of privacy" have come to be
referred to collectively as the "right to privacy." It is probably also an unfortunate
choice of words to refer to these clusters of rights as "privacy," since it is easy to
make linguistic arguments that some rights included under that rubric have little to
do with the concept of "privacy," properly understood. But these arguments have
no force against the underlying doctrine, but merely against the choice of terminology.
And it is careless or dishonest to suggest, as the Court does here, that the right
articulated by Douglas was limited to situations involving "marriage, procreation or
the family"; the discussion of those topics was merely the application of the general
principles to the facts of the particular case. Id. at 485 ("The present case, then
concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.").
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between Bork's originalism
and the Griswold case, see Reynolds, supra note 78 (concluding that an application of
Bork's interpretive theory would not necessarily have changed the result in
Griswold).
189 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937).
190 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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tradition." 191
These two characterizations of substantive due process limits
are often stated together, in apposition, as if they were essentially
synonymous. 9 2 But, as our discussion of Locke's account of how
we come to know the natural law makes clear, the two formulations
are essentially different. To Locke, and the Lockean framers of the
Constitution, tradition, even the basic tradition of our society, is not
an ultimately reliable source of knowledge and understanding as to
a natural right or, in other words, as to a substantive right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
Of course, in a system of precedent and common law, tradition
cannot be ignored. That system is itself based on tradition and authority, and respect for, and fidelity to, controlling precedent.
Where law created by human fiat is concerned, tradition and precedent may be an authentic source of such law. Even in the realm of
human rights and substantive due process, there is no reason why
tradition and commonly received wisdom may not function as a
guideline, or a rule of thumb. But, as we have seen, according to the
framers' understanding, tradition alone can never be an authentic
source for understanding the boundaries of substantive due process
and human rights.
On the other hand, Palko v. Connecticut presents a completely
different doctrine and gets the matter exactly right. The language
"liberties that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed,"' 95 is profoundly sensitive and faithful to the Lockean intentions of the framers. Some "liberties" (i.e., human rights) are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," (that is, they must necessarily remain with the people in a civil society), because if they
were sacrificed, legitimate political authority would be forfeited,
and, by definition, a legitimate political society would no longer exist. It is "implicit in the concept" (or definition) of a legitimate
political society that some human rights are necessarily retained by
the people.
The Court argues that the challenge to the Georgia statute fails
under both of these substantive due process tests, although the ar191 Id. at 2844 (citation omitted).
192 See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Justice Frankfurter argues
that the boundaries of due process rights are "not final and fixed," but "are derived
from considerations that are fixed in the whole nature of our judicial process....
These are considerations deeply rooted in reason and in the compelling traditions
of the legal profession. Id. at 325.
193

302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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gument displays the confusion I alluded to of treating the two tests
as essentially equivalent. Prohibitions of homosexual conduct
"have ancient roots . .. and [such conduct] was forbidden by the
laws of the original thirteen states when they ratified the Bill of
Rights."' 9 4 The Court concludes that "to claim that a right to engage in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best,
facetious." '9 While a conclusion about what is rooted in tradition
may follow from a description of historical laws, no conclusion whatsoever follows from such premises as to whether a right is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." The two inquiries, as Locke
taught us, could not be more distinct and dissimilar, and courts
should be careful not to run the two inquiries together.
What the Court's argument really accomplishes is a reductio ad
absurdum of the "history and tradition" test for the existence of a
human right. The argument, in essence, is that people have always
reviled and persecuted homosexuals; therefore, homosexuals have
no right against continued legalized persecution. But the capacity
of the human race to revile and persecute others is, if not unlimited,
fairly open ended. To make the existence of a right logically dependent upon whatever happens to be the fashion in persecution and
revulsion contradicts the concept of a right. To be more accurate, if
one understands the notion of a "right" to be limited to that which
was expressly and explicitly conferred by some human agency at
some moment in time, then there is no contradiction. In fact, we
would not even need the "history and tradition" test; all we need is
an authoritative copy of the words of those who conferred the right.
This is essentially the view of the "originalists." As I have argued, however, it was not the view of the framers. Until the commitment of the framers to human rights has been completely displaced
by the agenda of the "originalists," judges in cases such as this will
have an obligation, under the principles of their profession, to reason and agonize, not merely to point smugly at a history and tradition of persecution. The Court's conflation of the two substantive
due process tests is not just a theoretical error. It is dangerously
misleading insofar as it invites us to imagine wrongly that the only
kind of relevant argument is a discussion of history and tradition.
The Court's reasoning is "beyond the realm of the acceptable"
not because of the result it reaches, but because, proceeding from a
dogmatic prejudging of the result, the Court fails to identify the is194 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
195

Id. at 194.
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sue presented, and fails to address even the issue which it does identify according to the legally applicable standards. Apart from its
wholly unsatisfactory history and tradition argument, the majority
opinion in Bowers merely gives us the usual doctrinaire ranting about
"redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental,"' 9 6
and "expand[ing] the substantive reach of the [Due Process]
Clauses."'' 9 7 In Bowers, what purports to be Constitutional adjudication is, in fact, based on a theory about the task at hand-a theory
that prejudges the result without serious analysis or even a fair con98
sideration of the claims and arguments of one of the disputants.1
D.

Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalArgumentation
1.

Introduction

The purpose of this look at Bowers and Cruzan was not to review and analyze them thoroughly, but to use them as a springboard for deriving conclusions about the nature of constitutional
reasoning that a rational person would have to accept, regardless
of his or her political views, and regardless of the results to which
the application of those principles leads in a particular case. I am
referring, as always, to the clash between the claim of individual
right, and the claimed governmental right to restrict and regulate. Whether this task can be accomplished depends upon how
much burden is placed on the word "rational." At the threshold,
I think that a constitutional adjudicator must approach the task
with an open mind. The judge must acknowledge at the outset
that the two disputants have at least an equal prima facie right, or
a prioriright, to prevail. That is, before the substance of the claim
is known, the judge must, with a sufficiently open mind, listen to
arguments and considerations on both sides of the case.
But to adopt this mind set, the judge must accept that individual claims of constitutional right have, in general, the right to
be presented and considered seriously. This is exactly what the
originalists will not acknowledge. Have we reached an unbridge196

197

Id. at 195.
Id.

198 It can be argued persuasively that one of the major functions of an adjudicatory system is to give members of society the belief and feeling that it is possible for
them to obtain a serious, reasoned consideration of their petitions and grievances,
regardless of the eventual outcome. See, e.g., George C. Christie, Objectivity in the
Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, reprintedin part in EssAYs, supra note 31, at 1005. To the
extent that a theory of interpretation has the result that a court frequently abandons all pretense of a serious, sympathetic hearing of a litigant's arguments and
claims of constitutional right, an important function of the court system is lost.
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able impasse here at the threshold? If ajudge persists in the belief that there is only a short list of individual rights that are even
entitled to serious, thoughtful consideration, then I fear that we
are indeed at an impasse. If this is the mind set of the judge, then
the resulting style of adjudication is similar to Bowers v. Hardwick.
The judge looks at the title of the claim, matches it against the
titles on the short list, and if it is not found, dismisses the claim.
In short, the claim is not adjudicated at all.
To adopt this assembly line disposition of constitutional
claims, the judge must believe both that the principle of general
respect for human rights was no part of the constitution intended
by the framers, and also that regardless of the framers' intentions, there are no convincing arguments of social policy which
justify allowing litigants to obtain serious consideration of their
claims of individual right. On the basis of the considerations advanced in this article, and many others, the originalists' conclusion that the framers made no general commitment to individual
rights cannot rationally be maintained. On the other hand, it is
obvious that the philosophical underpinnings of the framers'
political and constitutional opinions are not unanimously shared
today. So it remains an open question as to whether the thinking
of the framers has been so discredited that it should be rejected
in the categorical, uncompromising terms that the "originalists"
reject it, or whether the framers' thinking retains some validity
and value even in the modern era.
I believe that the framers' wisdom does retain validity today,
and that society ignores their thinking at our peril. Do the framers' legal and constitutional ideals fall aside if one rejects their
views about natural rights, or is it possible to remain faithful to
the basic social and constitutional order which they intended
without accepting the philosophical structure which motivated
them? I submit that it is possible to accept the framers' general
commitment to human rights without accepting all their philosophy, and that there are good reasons for accepting the following
guidelines as reasonable principles of constitutional adjudication, even if one rejects the framers' views about natural rights. I
do not think that it can be conclusively demonstrated that these
guidelines must be accepted. These guidelines, however, are essentially faithful to the framers' intentions and they are independently defensible on social policy grounds. What these
principles of adjudication will lack for the modern reader is the
strong sense of inevitability and necessity that they had for the
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framers. For the framers, these principles were deeply embedded in a broader theory of what the world is and must be. For
the modern reader, the principles lack this kind of metaphysical
inevitability, so they must be justified by reference to social policy
goals and considerations.
2.

Principles of Constitutional Adjudication

First, the judge must understand and accept that the authority of a government to regulate human actions is limited by the
purposes and ends of civil government intended by the framers,
and that these purposes are best defined by the Lockean terminology of "peace and security," or something essentially similar.
Furthermore, it is the limitation or restriction of human freedom
that requires justification or explanation in terms of legitimate
governmental peace or security interests.
Second, the judge must understand that the peace and security involved is that of the other members of society. It is the
members of society who are the ultimate source of the delegated
powers of government, and the members of society whose quasicontractual or metaphorically contractual activity creates the civil
society. On the basis of the principles enacted by the framers,
there is no such thing as an "interest of society" or a "social interest" abstracted and distinct from the shared interests of the
members of society; "interest of society" means, and can only
mean, "generally shared interests of the members of society."
Understanding this should subtly affect judicial reasoning. It
may be a convenient abstraction, on occasion, to think of "society" as a great entity with desires and interests of its own, but the
judge must always remember that analytically, this will not do. In
rejecting a claim of individual right in favor of a governmental
right to regulate, it is always necessary for the judge to identify a
concrete interest possessed by the actual human members of the
society whose satisfaction justifies and rationalizes the governmental regulation. Judicial opinions endorsing governmental restriction on the basis of such vague considerations as "social
cohesiveness," or "the general integrity of society," are always
suspect, because they suggest that the judge has substituted
clich6 and metaphor in favor of an actual reasoned analysis of the
human interests at stake. An irrational (i.e., unexamined, unreasoned) demand for social conformity is never a sufficient basis for
a restriction on free human action, unless some basis for the de-
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mand for conformity, located in the concrete rights and interests
of other members of society, can be shown.
Third, as is clear from what has been said so far, a judge may
not merely decide a case on the basis of his or her preferences,
predilections or prejudices. To do so would be the very essence
of the abdication of the judicial function; the very essence of a
violation of the judge's. professional responsibility to society.
Bork takes the position that unless one interprets (or misinterprets) the Constitution to contain a short, exhaustive laundry list
of human rights, then any decision by a judge is necessarily a
mere expression of such preference. But this is a straightforward
empirical error. There is a difference between one's preference,
predilection or prejudice and one's reasoned conclusion on the
basis of applicable principles of analysis.
One could remake the English language, and redefine the
term "preference," as Bork does, to compel logically the result
that any decision a judge reaches is an expression of preference.
But this Borkian conceptual reformation has nothing to recommend it; there is no good reason to define the category of reasoning and rational analysis out of existence by subsuming it under
the heading of "preference." A great deal could be written about
the concept of "rationality" and the process of reaching a conclusion on the basis of rational considerations, but on its face, this is
a different activity from stating one's preference, predilection or
prejudice. This can be aptly illustrated by referring to Bowers. It
is perfectly possible for one to feel a personal distaste for homosexual activity, even a prejudice against it, and yet to reach the
reasoned conclusion that there is no valid basis for a government
to prohibit it, indeed that it would be a "despotic insanity" to do
99

SO.1

Fourth, despite Bork's remarkable claim (which he does not
maintain consistently) to the contrary, not every preference or
prejudice is equally entitled to deference. On the contrary, I
think that a judge must accept that the mere fact that I would
prefer that you did not exist, or that you would behave or conduct your life differently, is never in and of itself a sufficient reason to limit your freedom of action. The ability of human beings
to succumb to hatreds, passions and prejudices regarding their
fellow beings is logically unlimited. If society accepts that preference or prejudice is sufficient to limit the freedom of our fellow
citizens, then society is adopting a constitutional theory which
199 See TEMPrING, supra note 3, at 234.
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permits logically unlimited and unconfinable restrictions on
human liberty. One of the few bulwarks against mindless explosions of social passions and prejudices is the inculcation in the
members of society of the principles that everyone must be
treated rationally and fairly, and that there are principles and values which underlie and limit the behavior of majorities towards
non-conforming individuals and minorities.
Finally, courts must understand that notwithstanding the importance of precedent in our jurisprudence, tradition is never
dispositive, especially where tradition denies a right or freedom.
Restrictions on freedom must be rationally based, rather than
rooted in preference and prejudice of a legislature or a judge,
and must trace back to the peace and security interests of other
members of society. A judge must always be alert to the possibility that a tradition does not fulfill these conditions, and that the
tradition is, therefore, unauthorized and indefensible. A judge
must be unfailingly attentive to this possibility precisely because
these issues cannot be resolved by strict deductive arguments,
and precisely because a judge, like every other human being, is
vulnerable to passion, prejudice, insensitivity and irrationality.
That human beings inevitably suffer to some degree from
these infirmities is no reason to deny that it is the essence of the
judicial function to seek to minimize and surmount them. Further, it is no reason to deny that a collective, ongoing effort by
judges to review and rethink issues in the light of the wisdom
expressed in earlier opinions, is the best guarantee of fair and
rational adjudication which is humanly possible. Again, to some
extent, theory drives actuality. Does society want judges to be
steeped in the academic pronouncements of the originalists that
rationality is an illusion, and that when a judge agonizes over
clashing interests and values, all he can ever do in the end is to
express his own preference and desire? The danger is that some
judges will actually come to believe this, and having come to believe it, will conclude that the agonizing, draining process of reasoning about competing interests and values is futile and
unnecessary. But I submit that this is not the attitude with which
we want judges to approach their task. On the contrary, if there
are any members of society that should be thoroughly attuned to
the difference between calm and careful consideration, on the
one hand, and preference and prejudice, on the other hand, it is
judges.
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CONCLUSION

Bork himself cites a clear counterexample to his originalist
thesis, which he attributes to a student questioner at a lecture he
delivered. The student asked whether Bork thought that the
Constitution prohibited a state from abolishing marriage.2 0 0 It is

not clear whether "abolishing marriage" was intended as a euphemism for "prohibiting sexual intercourse," but the counterexample is effective in either case. Bork's strange response to the
counterexample was not so much to confess and avoid as to confess and ignore. Bork responded:
I said no, the Constitution assumed that the American people
were not about to engage in despotic insanities and did not
bother to protect against every imaginable instance of them.
[The student] replied that he could not accept a constitutional
theory that did not prevent the criminalization of marriage. It
would have been proper to respond that in any society that
had reached such a degenerate state of totalitarianism...

it

would hardly matter what constitutional theory once held; the
Constitution would long since have been swept aside and the
Justices consigned to reeducation camps, if not worse. The
actual Constitution does not forbid every ghastly hypothetical
law, and once you begin to invent doctrine
that does, you will
20 1
create unconfinable judicial power.
But this does not address the force of the counterexample.
Many people would be surprised and dismayed to learn that in the
opinion of a man who almost became a Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, a state legislature may constitutionally enact a "despotic insanity." One would assume that our Constitution did protect
citizens against despotic insanities, and one certainly would feel
more secure in a society which did. Fortunately, the framers agreed,
and made it clear that the very essence of their undertaking was to
draft their Constitution in response to what they considered "despotic insanities."
The most interesting feature of Bork's response is his acknowledgment that there is such a thing as a law, duly enacted through
proper procedures by a democratically constituted legislature, that
may properly be classified as a "despotic insanity." This is notwithstanding the fact that a majority of the legislature evidently preferred the law in question. Apparently, not every preference is
equally worthy of gratification after all, unless all Bork means by a
200
201

Id.
Id.
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"despotic insanity" is a law of which he personally disapproves. It is
clear, though, that Bork does not use the phrase "despotic insanity"
in this radically subjectivist sense; he uses it to mean-well-a despotic insanity. And it is totally incomprehensible how Bork, on the
basis of the principles he endorses, could refer to a hypothetical situation where a duly constituted legislature enacted a law of which
he disapproves as a "degenerate state of totalitarianism."
Bork contradicts himself here. Unless one acknowledges that
there is some valid standard of moral evaluation, independent of the
democratically elected majority's preferences, for assessing those
preferences, then it is logically impossible to condemn those preferences in such normative terms as "insanity," "degenerate," and "totalitarian" (unless one is merely expressing disapproval). But Bork
does condemn some hypothetical preferences. Further, if he condemns a hypothetical expression of legislative preference, then he is
also logically committed to the possibility of condemning actual
preferences (using the word "condemn" in a sense other than the
mere expression of subjective disapproval). One should not be surprised that Bork contradicts himself in this way; as I observed earlier, the radically subjectivist moral theory which Bork ostensibly
espouses is so counterintuitive, and so contrary to what we really
believe, upon reflection, about moral matters, that his theory is almost impossible to maintain consistently.
Bork's response to the counterexample is first that as a matter
of empirical fact, the American people would never enact a despotically insane law, and second, that if they ever did, this could only
mean that society had reached such a stage of decay and collapse
that nothing much would matter any more. Both of these propositions are surely false. It is fatuous to imagine that the American
people could never act in a despotically insane fashion. On the contrary, a broad majority of the American people-and many other
people-have on more than one occasion consciously and deliberately adopted social beliefs, and engaged in conduct which
amounted to despotic insanity. 2 ' Certainly the institution of slavery, and texture of laws, policies and institutions which supported it
is one illustration. Many would argue that ajudicial decision such as
Bowers v. Hardwick,2 "° and the statutes on which it is based, is
202 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Supreme Court
upholding about as despotic a regulation that has ever been devised by our government-one that placed loyal United States citizens ofJapanese ancestry into internment camps under the pretense of national security).
203 478 U.S. 186, rehk'gdenied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986); see supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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another.
Nor is there any reason to think that the enactment of a despotically insane law is conceivable only where all semblance and all remnants of constitutional order have vanished. By Bork's hypothesis,
the despotically insane law was chosen by a majority of the democratically elected legislature. And by Bork's constitutional theory,
judges have no authority, based upon a theory of human rights, to
assail the despotically insane law. Based on Bork's own vision of the
proper constitutional order, the majority need not fear that judges
will effectively challenge their insane despotism. Only the victims of
the insanely despotic law have the motivation to challenge it, and
while they may generate some level of social instability and disorder,
there is no reason to suppose that this could not be effectively suppressed by the majority, and the instruments of force they control.
This may not be Bork's view, but I suspect that it is Michael Hardwick's view.
American society under slavery immediately refutes Bork's
hasty supposition that an insanely despotic law could be enacted by
the American people only in a situation where society had collapsed
to the extent that "the Constitution would long since have been
swept aside." Without doubt, the institution of slavery constituted
moral decay and collapse, and without doubt the institution was flagrantly inconsistent with the Constitutional principles of human dignity, human worth and human rights. To that extent, and in that
respect, the Constitution had always been swept aside. American
society during the entire period of slavery, however, was plainly not
in a situation of total decay and collapse, where "all semblance of
constitutional organization was swept aside," and judges were "consigned to reeducation camps, if not worse."
Bork's response to the student shows an amazing indifference
to or lack of recognition of the real logical force of the device of
refutation by hypothetical counterexample. Bork's interlocutor
presents an example, and asks: "Does your theory not have the absurd consequence that the law against marriage could be constitutionally enacted?" Bork's response is, in effect: "Yes, the theory
does have that consequence, but don't worry about it, it could never
happen." But to reject the force of the hypothetical example on the
grounds that it is hypothetical fails to confront the argument.
Bork's response both acknowledges that his theory does have the
stated consequence, and fails to deny that the consequence is absurd. As the dialogue stands, therefore, the counterexample is unrefuted, and the student interlocutor has prevailed.
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It is precisely the real possibility of despotic insanity, and the
real need to guard against it, which make Bork's notion of a morally
indifferent Constitution-a Constitution which fails to include a
general commitment to human rights, or to set forth any general
vision of a desirable society-so troubling, if not dangerous. Obviously, constitutional theory alone cannot fully protect against despotic usurpations of power. Today, the pen may or may not be
mightier than the sword, now that "sword" has become a metaphor.
But the confusions of the "originalists," and their mischievous and
fanciful notion that their views represent the framers' intentions, are
deplorable. The best protection against "despotic insanity" is for
people to understand that the framers did intend to create a Constitution which embodies moral ideals, which accords ultimate value to
the rights and freedoms of individuals by creating zones which are
secure against governmental restriction and interference; and in
which neither legislatures nor judges are free to enact their own
preferences, predilections or prejudices in the performance of their
constitutionally mandated duties, but rather where both the legislatures and judges are constrained and limited by the principles and
values expressed in the Constitution.

